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This study aimed to analyze the dishonest behavior of individuals when they are about to 
make a group decision. For this, three experiments were developed, based on the die-rolling 
game, and applied to students of Accounting in three different universities. Each experiment 
also had a different purpose: the first one intended to evaluate the influence of the group in the 
decision of the individuals regarding dishonesty; the second analyzed whether the existence of 
a leader could induce the participants to be more dishonest; and the third sought to present 
whether control mechanisms  would be able to inhibit or decrease dishonesty. Therefore, three 
papers were prepared, each containing one experiment. The experiments were performed with 
634 participants in total (250 in the first, 180 in the second and 204 in the third) in which they 
would watch a die-rolling game and report the number shown by the dice. Nevertheless, the 
payment was tied to the number they reported and not to the number displayed, making 
dishonesty possible. In all the experiments it was possible to corroborate the hypothesis of the 
research: in the first, it was verified that the individuals are more dishonest when they must 
make the decision in group rather than individually; in the second experiment, it was 
evidenced that the insertion of a leader made the participants have more dishonest attitudes; 
and, finally, in the third, the control mechanisms presented (auditing and reading articles in 
the Professional Code of Ethics of the Accountant) resulted in more honest decisions. This 
work puts into question the research on dishonesty, not only its ethical and moral aspects, but 
also its financial impacts. It is worth mentioning that this research does not propose to exhaust 
the subject about dishonesty nor does it seek to analyze individuals' internal motivations about 
their decisions, understanding that these topics are related to other sciences (such as 
Psychology and Sociology, for example). The objective was to verify the existence of 
dishonesty, its possible impacts and some mechanisms capable of decreasing it, where the 
decisions are made by a group of people, similar to the corporate environments. 
 









Esse estudo teve como objetivo analisar o comportamento desonesto dos indivíduos quando 
os mesmos devem tomar decisões em grupo. Para isso, foram desenvolvidos três 
experimentos, baseados no jogo de dados, sendo aplicado em estudantes de Ciências 
Contábeis, em três universidades diferentes. Cada experimento também apresentou um 
propósito diferente: o primeiro teve como objetivo avaliar a influência do grupo na decisão 
dos indivíduos sobre a desonestidade; o segundo foi analisar se a existência de um líder 
poderia induzir os participantes a serem mais desonestos; e o terceiro, buscou apresentar se os 
possíveis mecanismos de controle seriam capazes de inibir ou diminuir a desonestidade. Para 
isso, foram desenvolvidos três artigos, cada um contendo um experimento. Os experimentos 
foram realizados com 634 participantes no total (250 no primeiro, 180 no segundo e 204 no 
terceiro) no qual eles deveriam assistir a um lançamento de dado e informar o número 
mostrado pelo dado. Contudo, a remuneração estava atrelada ao número que eles informaram 
e não ao número visto, possibilitando assim, serem desonestos. Em todos os experimentos foi 
possível corroborar a hipótese da pesquisa: no primeiro, verificou-se que os indivíduos são 
mais desonestos quando devem tomar a decisão em grupo do que individualmente; no 
segundo experimento, evidenciou-se que a inserção de um líder fez com que os participantes 
tivessem atitudes mais desonestas; e, por fim, no terceiro, os mecanismos de controle 
apresentados (auditoria e a leitura de artigos do Código de Ética Profissional do Contador) fez 
com que os mesmos tomassem decisões mais honestas. Esse trabalho coloca em discussão a 
pesquisa sobre a desonestidade, não só os seus aspectos éticos e morais, mas também os seus 
impactos financeiros. Vale ressaltar que o mesmo não se propõe a esgotar o assunto sobre a 
desonestidade nem busca analisar motivações internas dos indivíduos sobre suas decisões, 
entendendo que esses tópicos se relacionam com outras ciências (como a Psicologia e a 
Sociologia, por exemplo). O intuito foi verificar a existência da desonestidade, seus possíveis 
impactos e alguns mecanismos capazes de diminuí-lo, em locais onde as tomadas de decisões 
são realizadas por um grupo de pessoas, semelhante aos ambientes corporativos. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this research, three studies with application of different methodologies concerning 
the dishonest behavior of the individuals when they are inserted in a group will be carried 
out. For that, this introduction  contextualize the theme in question, presenting the research 
problem, the general and specific purposes of the study, as well as the reasons that justify the 
choice of this theme and its significance to the science. Moreover, this very introduction 




Dishonest actions are common in everyday life: not only actions performed by 
professional criminals – robbery, kidnapping, drug trafficking, etc – but also consumers and 
companies who behave in an ethically questionable way, such as the company Enron, tax 
evasion in the declaration of income tax or even through illegal download files over the 
internet. 
Several researches have tried to understand the dishonest behavior of the people and 
their reasons to cheat: DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer and Epstein  (1996) verified that the 
frequency with which people lie ranges from 20 to 31% in their social interactions; the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) states that more than USD 1 trillion dollars is 
spent each year on bribes and about USD 2.6 trillion are diverted into corruption, which is 
equivalent to 5% of World’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product); in the academic area, List, 
Bailey, Euzent and Martin (2001) identified the existence of a significant amount of 
misconduct, in relation to the expropriation of undergraduate and postgraduate student 
research and the inclusion of authors in undeserving academic works. 
In traditional economics, the concept of fraud comes from economist Gary Becker 
(1968), who developed the theory of the Simple Model of Rational Crime (SMORC). This 
theory states that people commit a crime based on a rational analysis of each situation, taking 
into account the benefits they will receive from the action, the risk of being discovered and 
the applicable punishment. Namely, decisions about dishonesty are made on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis of the situation. However, Becker (1993) also states that ethical, social 
and cultural factors can influence this process; in other words it is not a purely rational 
decision. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) admit that, when faced with questions of financial 
gains and losses, there are anomalies which violate the principles of rationality. In this 
sense, Ariely (2012) points out that fraudulent behavior is also influenced by self-
 justifications, which can be considered irrational. Namely, although there is an opportunity to 
achieve superior gains, individuals are not too dishonest so that they won't feel guilty or injure 
their own ethical standards. 
Thereby, Ariely (2012) develops a theory whose central idea is that dishonest behavior 
would be driven by two opposing motivations: a financial motivation, the individual wants to 
benefit as much as possible through dishonest methods and also achieve the maximum 
possible profit (traditional motivation); and on the other hand, there is the ego motivation, 
people want to feel honest, look in the mirror and feel good about themselves. Since both are 
antagonistic concepts, people live in a constant internal conflict, trying to balance these two 
feelings. Because of that, this theory is called the Margin Maneuver Theory, since at all times, 
humans manage their actions and feelings in a way that  they achieve the maximum possible 
benefits with cheating and without hurting their ethical self-concepts. 
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Nevertheless, both in Brazilian and international literature, there is relatively rich 
evidence on the dishonest behavior of individuals and their motivations (for example Mazar, 
Amir & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; Castillo, Petrie, 
Torero & Viceisza, 2014; Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, Avelino & Cunha, 2017; Tomazelli, 
2011), however, there are few studies about the dishonest behavior of groups. 
 Recently, a number of examples of dishonest behavior in groups and in organizations 
stood out, with fraudulent accounting methods and bad practices of groups of 
executives that led large companies to bankruptcy, such as WorldCom and Enron. In Brazil, 
recent corruption scandals involving companies such as Petrobras, Furnas, Eletronuclear and 
several companies in the construction sector – Odebrecht, OAS, Queiroz Galvão, among 
others – have an impact not only on the Brazilian economy as a whole, but also externally in 
the public image of the country. This is identified in these recent scandals given that dishonest 
decisions were made by a group of individuals and not by a particular individual. In the same 
way, decisions made by committees of economic affairs and political organizations are taken 
by a group of individuals . Researches such as Charness and Sutter (2012) and Kugler, 
Bornstein, Kocher and Sutter (2007) suggest that the same people who make honest decisions 
individually are or may be dishonest when they decide as a group. In his laboratory 
experiment, Sutter (2009) showed that people behave more dishonestly in groups than 
individually. 
However, there are also researches that argues that, when people are in a group, there 
is a tendency for less dishonest behavior than otherwise: first, social concerns about the image 
are stronger in the group than individual ones (Bénabou, 2012; Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006); second, group interaction can make individuals better at understand norms, and such 
interaction can reduce dishonest behavior (Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017); and third, there 
is also evidence that moral reminders – such as reciting the 10 commandments or swearing on 
the Bible – can reduce dishonesty (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013; Ariely, 2012). Therefore, 
when conducting group discussions, they may lie less. 
  
1.2. Research Problem 
  
              The topic about honesty, be it individual or in a group, is closely connected with 
accounting. This discussion pervades areas such as controllership, auditing, fiscal and public 
accounting, among others. Understanding how dishonesty takes place within a social group 
and the mechanisms that trigger this attitude and its effects on the generation of value to an 
organization and society is relevant. 
              Thus, it is extremely important to study dishonest behaviors, especially in countries 
that suffer the most from this type of problem, as it is the case in Brazil: according to the 
index of corruption measured by the World Economic Forum (2016), Brazil is the fourth 
most corrupt nation in the world, behind only Chad, Bolivia and Venezuela, which leads 
the ranking. The survey carried out by the Swiss organization was conducted with 15,000 
business leaders from 141 countries and Brazil received the 2.1 score on a scale of one to 
seven. In another study released by the NGO (non-governamental organization) Transparency 
International (2016), the country ranked 79
th
 in a list of perception of corruption in the world 
among 176 countries. 
Furthermore, there is a shortage of papers that investigate the influence of the group 
on the dishonest behavior of individuals, both in Brazil and internationally: there are already 
numerous studies that address the issue of individual dishonesty (Glätzer-Rützler & 
Lergetporer, 2015; Ariely, 2012; Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy, Rockenbach & Serra-Garcia, 2013; 
Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, Avelino & Cunha, 2017; Santos, 2011; Mazar; Amir & Ariely, 
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2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006). However, when it comes to the dishonest behavior of 
individuals in groups, the research is still incipient, and only international studies are found: 
some results corroborate the assertion that individuals are more dishonest when they are 
inserted in a group context rather than individually (Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017; 
Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke & Walkowitz, 2013; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Chitilová 
& Korbel, 2014). On the other hand, other results indicate that, when inserted in a group, 
people behave more honestly, either by the concern with their image or by living with others 
(Bénabou, 2012; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Sutter, 2009; Charness & Sutter, 2012; Kugler et 
al., 2007). 
Thus, this study proposes to investigate the influence of the group in the decision 
making of the individual and possible mechanisms that would be able to influence dishonest 
behavior. 
Based on this context, the study aims to explore the following question: 
Are there differences in the degree of dishonesty of groups and individuals? 
  
1.3. General and Specific Purposes 
  
The main objective of this study is to analyze dishonest behavior, comparing 
individual and collective decisions, as well as identifying mechanisms capable 
of influencing this behavior. 
As the focus lies on dishonest behavior, three studies will be conducted with the 
following purposes: 
  
Study 1: Evaluating the effect that a social group can have on the individual’s honesty. In this 
way, it will be verified if the group influences the decision of the individual, especially 
concerning the fulfillment of ethical norms. 
  
Study 2: Analyzing whether the existence of an individual in a situation of superiority (such 
as a boss or high executive) would influence a dishonest behavior. Thus, it will be verified if 
the individual power of the leader influences the dishonesty of its subordinates. 
  
Study 3: Showing how the insertion of control mechanisms, in this case auditing and 
professional ethical norms, influence the dishonest behavior of individuals in groups. 
  
              The nature of these studies composes a subset of researches about dishonest 
behavior, both individual and in group, whose purpose is to identify differences in dishonesty 
committed individually and collectively and possible mechanisms that influence this 
behavior. 
  
1.4. Theme Justification 
  
The dishonest behavior and the morality of the individuals have been analyzed in 
several studies, both in Brazil and international (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & 
Ariely, 2006; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; Santos, 2011; Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, Avelino 
& Cunha, 2017). In the study of Ariely (2012), it was perceived that the problem of 
dishonesty has a universal character: different cultures, be it national, regional or business-
related, contribute to the occurrence of dishonest acts. Ariely (2012) compared, using an 
experiment out of any cultural context, the dishonesty of individuals from different countries, 
15 
 
such as Israel, the United States, Italy, England and Turkey, and found no different levels of 
cheating. This corroborates the idea that the human being is morally flexible and is able to 
reshape situations and actions so that they can feel comfortable with themselves. 
However, daily activities are intertwined in a cultural context that can influence 
dishonesty, modifying the tolerable room for maneuver considered dishonest for each 
individual. In this way, as Ariely (2012) points out, there is still something to be learned about 
the influence of culture in cheating, not only in terms of social influences that help to curb 
dishonesty, but also in the social forces that make it stronger. 
Thus, this study seeks to identify the influence of these social forces that can either 
decrease or increase  dishonesty levels, and also become a basis for a study of Fischbacher 
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017), international researches 
that evaluated the influence of the group on the dishonesty of individuals. 
Taking into account the concern regarding ethics in business attitudes, the study of 
dishonesty becomes even more relevant. Internationally, some authors have been developing 
studies about group effects and they found that dishonesty is greater in groups when 
compared with individuals (Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017; Lee, Im, Parmar & Gino, 2015; 
Chytilová & Korbel, 2014; Sutter, 2009; Muehlheusser, Roider & Wallmeier, 2015; 
Conrads et al., 2013; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). About Brazil, it can be seen that 
this issue is deeply engraved, and there is a need to understand dishonest behavior in its 
fullness, considering the group effect, aiming to bring to debate a relevant element to 
accounting researches, whereas the first researches was focused on the dishonesty of 
individuals, as in the case of Lima, Avelino and Cunha (2017), Santos (2011), Melo Segundo 
(2016) and Ganassin (2016). 
The testimony of Andrew Fastow to US courts, the former CFO (Chief Financial 
Officer) of Enron, when asked about the accusations of corruption registered against him said 
the following: "(...) I stole from Enron. I really did. We stole from Enron" (The Enron Trial, 
2016). When asked about what the "we" meant, the former Enron CFO said that it was 
referring to him and the other managers of the bankrupt company. From this statement, one 
can see that the scandals of corruption and fraud in a company are not always linked to one 
person only: these scandals are mostly held in large companies, involving several 
members, even seniors, as was the case of Enron, in US, and Petrobras, recently in Brazil. 
Furthermore, corruption is one of the great evils of Brazilian society:  in spite of 
having one the largest economies in the world, Brazil is still considered to be a developing 
country due to its high rates of illiteracy and corruption. In addition, 70% of Brazilians 
consider corruption as one of the main problems of the country (Rosa, Bernardo, Vicente & 
Petri 2015). Some reasons for this perception would be the corruption scandals involving 
Petrobras, the growing unemployment and problems in the economy. 
Nevertheless, the problem of dishonesty is not exclusive to the public sector: by 
proposing the Agency Theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that the conflict of 
interests and the informational asymmetry existing in the relation between agent and 
principals can lead to the problem of Agency, causing the agent to incur ethical deviations to 
achieve his own interests. The assumption of this conflicting relationship and the 
maximization of well-being lead individuals to fraudulent actions and noncompliance with 
their obligations. Dumer, Brambati, Souza and Gobbi (2016) have shown that the main 
motivators of tax fraud by business managers are the disappointment with the State to perform 
the public administration function and the financial accumulation of the company, in order to 
yield greater profits. 
Therefore, identifying those responsible for fraudulent acts and their motivators can 
help to combat these deviations. In this context, accounting can be inserted as a fundamental 
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piece in the control of dishonest acts, since it can help in the control of internal procedures of 
the company and in the verification of possible deviations. 
Furthermore, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in its Conceptual 
Framework (2018) expressed that the general purpose of financial reporting must have two 
fundamental qualitative characteristics: relevance and faithful representation. In other words, 
the financial information is to be useful  in a sense that the information should not 
only present a relevant phenomenon, but also faithfully represent the reality being portrayed, 
being complete, neutral, and error-free. This indicates that the accounting information gains 
value as it is presented without deviations. 
In view of the above, it is important to understand the mechanisms that drive dishonest 
attitudes and their effects on the value of companies and the general society in order to help in 
the creation of more effective control mechanisms. 
  
1.5.    Research Contributions 
  
As previously seen on the topic of collective dishonesty, there are still few studies on 
the issue in question, and the ones that exist dates from the year 2005 onwards, characterized 
as recent. 
In the international context, there is no consensus on whether individuals tend to be 
more honest in groups or individually: some researches points out that, when 
inserted into groups, people are more inclined to be dishonest than when they make decisions 
individually (Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017; Conrads et al., 2013; Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013; Chytilová & Korbel, 2014); on the other hand, other researches indicates that 
when in a group, people are more honest because of the fear that their image might be stained 
and the influence that social interaction causes in their decision-making (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2006; Sutter, 2009; Kugler et al., 2007). In Brazil, there is still no research that investigates 
dishonest behavior in a group, only at the individual level (Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, 
Avelino & Cunha, 2017). 
Thus, the contribution of this research is, given the increase of studies on the theme, to 
identify characteristics of dishonest behavior in a group in another cultural and legal context, 
as the case in Brazil. Besides the fact that there is no research on the topic of group dishonesty 
in Brazil, the analysis of the influence of the leader and the investigation of inhibiting 
mechanisms, such as auditing and ethics, are an innovation in dishonesty researches, 
expanding the scope of this subject. In addition, this thesis is structured in three related 
researches, addressing different and complementary aspects related to dishonesty, filling a gap 
in the literature, since national surveys deal only with dishonesty at the individual level. 
Moreover, the three studies cover different topics about dishonesty: the first seeks to 
identify differences in collective and individual dishonesty; in the second, if the leader's 
individual power influences dishonest behavior; and in the third study, possible mechanisms 
inhibiting dishonesty in the group. 
Although the format of the experiments is based on the works 
of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017), the present 
research differs substantially from the study presented by Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013) since only the die-rolling was employed to test dishonesty, an element easily 
understood by different audiences, so there were no problems of misunderstanding the 
experiment by the participants. 
From the study of Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017) the idea of the division of the 
groups in GroupPC (payoff commonality) and GroupNoPC (no payoff commonality) (the 
original names were kept in the study) and the conversation between the members of the 
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group through chat was withdrawn. However, there are substantial differences from the 
present research to the previous one: the experiment conducted by the authors in question was 
divided into three phases, the first and last at the individual level and only the second was 
performed in a group; between each stage of the experiment, participants should assume 
whether the members of the other groups were dishonest or not (participants made more 
money if their hypotheses were correct). In addition, the format of the second (when it comes 
to the influence of the leader) and the third experiment of the present research (on the 
mechanisms that inhibit dishonesty) have no relation with the researches cited above. This is 
an innovation in this research, because there is no paper that analyzes dishonesty in a group, 
with a component that is capable of influencing the others, such as a leader, and studies that 
explore control mechanism that stimulates a decrease in dishonesty. 
It is also important to emphasize that this study does not intend to evaluate the internal 
considerations of each individual such as the choice of honesty or dishonesty, because this 
area is the aim of Psychology’s studies. Although the present research uses concepts derived 
from this area, the purpose here is not to understand aspects related to the unconscious (as in 
the researches of Freud and Jacques Lacan) or subjective formations, but only analyzing the 
existence or not  of dishonesty between individuals and groups, also trying to present possible 
mechanisms that inhibit dishonesty, applied in a simulation of a daily accounting reality. 
Thereby, it is understood that this study contributes to the literature in the 
comprehension of the collective dishonest behavior, which is, for example, similar to the 
decision making in the companies, besides seeking to find inhibitor mechanisms of this 
behavior. 
  
1.6.    Thesis Structure 
  
In order to analyze dishonest behavior in individual decisions and those taken in 
groups, experiments will be carried out with undergraduate students (Elliot, Hodge, Kennedy 
& Pronk, 2007; Elliott, Hodge & Jackson, 2008). This choice was made because of 
accessibility and ease of data collection, and also their answers can be used as proxies for 
individual investors with different knowledgment levels, and is justified because they will be 
the future decision makers of these companies, so their level of dishonesty, both individually 
and in groups, will impact the market as a whole, aware that there is a limitation to the 
research. Thus, the data found in this research can not be generalized to all environments, also 
due to the hypothetical nature of the experiments, however, the results serve as a parameter to 
identify dishonest behavior, especially in a group, in situations of a simpler character that can 
be indicative of the behavior of these individuals when faced with situations of greater 
complexity. 
It was decided to structure the thesis as a set of studies (papers) listing the most 
relevant themes for the study concerning group dishonesty. The experiments were based on 
the die-rolling by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) 
and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017), in which the respondent's remuneration could be 
maximized by their dishonesty. 
It is noteworthy that during all experiments, each participant used a computer, 
randomly, and all received the same instructions on how to proceed in each stage of the 
experiment, and questions were asked in order to verify that the participant understood the 
next steps. Each stage of the experiment only allows them to begin the next one when all the 
remaining participants finished the previous stage. Also, no communication was allowed 
between the participants during the experiments (except during chats). Before the 
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experiments, participants answered a questionnaire to identify their personal characteristics 
such as gender and family income, for example. 
The pre-test was carried out with four undergraduate students to verify if the text was 
clear, if it was not too large and the time available for the chat. Two subjects judged that the 
time for the chat (initially 3 minutes) was excessive for the conversation, reducing it to 2 
minutes. Furthermore, it was suggested, in the third experiment, the inclusion of a question to 
testify that the respondents read the articles from the Professional Code of Ethics of the 
Accountant. 
About the experiments, the design chosen was the within-subjects design, that is the 
one in which the participants are exposed to different treatments (in this case, different aspects 
about dishonesty) and their decisions analyzed (Hsu, Simmons & Wieland, 2016). The choice 
of this design was due, in particular, to the possibility of sample reduction, since the 
individuals who participate also control each other, and the consequent decrease of the money 
spent. One of the drawbacks of this model is the so-called carryover effects, in which the 
responses from previous steps may affect subsequent treatments (Aronson, Wilson & Brewer, 
1990). 
The experiments were carried out in the laboratories of the universities, at the same 
time where the students would be in the classroom. This type of configuration has as main 
advantages the isolation of the participants from the real world, reducing noise and 
environmental influences (Colquitt, 2008) and their good suitability in subjects still little 
explored, as is the case of collective dishonesty due to its low cost, enabling it to be expanded 
later under more detailed conditions (Hsu, Simmons & Wieland, 2016). 
One of the concerns when using experiments in papers lies on the external validity of 
the model, that is, if the results found in the research can be generalized to professionals 
working in the market. Although there is some questioning on the subject, there is evidence in 
Psychology and Sociology that emphasize that the purpose of using experiments is to examine 
their internal validity and causality, not generalization (Mook, 1983; Aronson, Wilson & 
Brewer, 1990; Shaver, 2014). The objective of using experiments is to investigate what the 
theory proposes (Hsu, Simmons & Wieland, 2016) and, if relations are supported, to test in 
the natural environment to propose generalization (Mook, 1983; Berkowitz & Donnerstein, 
1982). 
Beyond this introductory chapter, the thesis is organized in three more chapters, which 
present the three studies proposed in this research: each chapter containing the theoretical 
basis, the method that was used, the results found and the conclusions; a chapter where the 
conclusions of the study are combined with the answer of the central research question; and, 
finally, the references.  
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2 COLLECTIVE DISHONESTY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE GROUP'S INFLUENCE IN 
THE DISHONESTY BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUALS 
 
 News of dishonest acts has become increasingly frequent, whether in the politics or 
daily life by the citizen, as well as in cases of scandals involving corruption schemes in 
companies. To explain the dishonesty process, the Maneuver Margin Theory, developed by 
Ariely (2012), states that the individual performs internal "maneuvers", balancing the benefits 
that he will receive with the act and the self-concept that they have of themselves. In order to 
verify if individuals are more dishonest when they are about to make decisions in groups 
rather than individually, an experiment was conducted with 250 Accounting students, where 
they should observe the die-rolling game and then report the number seen. The remuneration 
of the participants was linked to the number reported and not the number displayed, thus 
enabling them to be dishonest. In the first round, the participants should make their decisions 
individually, and in the second stage, the individuals were divided into groups of 3 people 
each and should make the decisions collectively. For that, a chat was made available so that 
they could talk. The results of the research corroborated the initial hypothesis that individuals 
are more dishonest when making decisions in a group (36% of participants) comparing to 




Cases of corruption involving well-known companies have been a recurring theme in 
the news, not only in Brazil, but also internationally. In many of these situations, the cases of 
fraud and corruption occurring in the company were committed not only by lower-level 
officials, but also by the top management of the company. 
              The traditional economic theory, based on the research of Becker (1968), is based on 
a dishonest act committed by taking into account a cost-benefit relationship, that is, the 
individual takes into account the benefits that he will receive with the dishonest act, the risk of 
being discovered and the punishment for the act. By balancing all these factors and verifying 
if the pros outweigh the cons, the individual will make a dishonest decision, which is purely 
rational. 
              Nevertheless, Becker (1993), years later, identified that non-rational factors, such as 
culture and ethics, can influence this process. Thus, Ariely (2012) developed the Maneuver 
Margin Theory, in which he affirms that dishonest acts are not committed rationally, but 
rather the individual performs internal "maneuvers", balancing the benefits that he will 
receive with the act and the self-concept they have of themselves. Even if the benefit of the 
dishonest act is too high, if it does not injure their threshold of dishonesty, the individual will 
not consider himself dishonest. The literature has shown that some individuals often renounce 
monetary benefits for honest behavior, in other words, even if there is a future positive cash 
flow when acting dishonestly, some individuals adopt an honest behavior (Abeler, Becker & 
Falk, 2014; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Kröll & Rustagi, 2016; Gneezy, 2005; 
Gneezy, Rockenbach & Serra-Garcia, 2013; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Glätzle-Rützler & 
Lergetporer, 2015). 
              Some authors have been conducting researches about dishonest behavior in 
individuals (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; 
Santos, 2011; Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, Avelino & Cunha, 2017). Though, in view of 
recent corruption scandals involving companies around the world, such as WorldCom, Enron, 
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Volkswagen, Deutsche Bank, and in Brazil, such as those of Petrobras, Eletrobras, Furnas and 
the various civil construction companies involved in the “Lava Jato” operation, it became 
necessary to investigate the motivators of the dishonest behavior of individuals in 
organizations. 
              International investigations are beginning the studies about group dishonesty 
(Conrads et al., 2013; Baeker & Mechtel, 2015; Sutter, 2009; Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Kocher, 
Strauß, & Sutter, 2006; Muehlheusser, Roider & Wallmeier, 2015; Kocher, Schudy & 
Spantig, 2017), however, no research was found in the Brazilian literature that approached the 
theme. Much of the previous research has focused on the study of individual dishonest 
behavior, which is due not only to the need for research purposes but also to the ease of 
obtaining the data. The study of collective dishonesty becomes more difficult due to the 
existence of few previous works, difficulty in the logistics of gathering a large group of 
people to perform the experiment and in the interpretation of the data obtained collectively. 
              In addition, with corruption scandals in Brazil recently, involving illicit money 
exchange between politicians and several companies of different branches such as civil 
construction and food products, it is necessary to understand the dishonest behavior of 
individuals, especially when they are inserted in a group context. Besides, and specifically, in 
2016, the state of Rio de Janeiro decreed a state of public calamity due to lack of money in 
public treasury, which resulted in the lack of payment of salaries to employees, the 
maintenance of basic services such as health, education and security, and the attempt 
to implement measures to reduce spendings. One of the justifications for the state of Rio de 
Janeiro to have reached this level is corruption: the operation "Fatura Exposta", one of “Lava 
Jato”'s developments in the state, has already arrested the former governor of Rio de Janeiro, 
Sérgio Cabral, the former secretary of health, several important businessmen for the state, 
such as Eike Batista, and even the president and four advisors of the Court of Audit of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro, caught in million-dollar corruption schemes. 
              With the recent corruption scandals involving Brazilian and international companies 
and based on the theory that individuals do not commit dishonest acts only by analyzing the 
situation rationally, the research problem arises: When analyzing the decision making 
process, individuals, when inserted in groups, present behaviors that are more dishonest 
than those that decide individually? 
              Thus, the objective of this research is to verify if there is more dishonesty when 
decisions are taken in group when compared to the individual ones. For this, an experiment 
will be carried out, adapting the methodology used by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) 
and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017). 
              In the next section it will be presented the theoretical basis with the concepts about 
Simple Theory of Rational Crime (SMORC) and Maneuver Margin Theory; then the design 
experiment, its application,  stages and methodologies used will be outlined; soon after, the 
results found in the research are described, and, finally, the final considerations are put. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
In order to investigate the dishonest behavior of individuals, there are two different 
approaches in the literature: the first concerns an exclusively cost-benefit analysis, in which 
the individual chooses to be dishonest or not based on the reward he will receive his act, 
estimating the probability of being caught and the corresponding punishment. On the other 
hand, the second approach, basically based on concepts from Psychology, Sociology, 
Behavioral Economics and Neuroscience, adds the dimension that there are also internal 
considerations of each human being that takes part in the dishonesty decision. 
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In the standard economic theory approach, the individual is rational, therefore he 
compares payoffs in order to choose the option that maximizes his earnings. As this analysis 
only considers external costs and benefits, the decision for dishonesty is made when the 
benefits (profitability) are greater than the costs (punishment) triggered by dishonest decision-
making (Becker, 1968; Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). 
This external cost-benefit view is the central theme of the SMORC theory and also 
serves as the basis for most of the existing policy measures to prevent dishonesty (Santos, 
2011). As this view is widely adopted in the legal area, efforts to curb dishonest behavior are 
based on the creation of more severe punishments and on the ever-increasing supervisor of 
individuals. 
Therefore, the external cost-benefit analysis or the SMORC theory claims that there 
are three variables that influence dishonest decision making: the probability of being caught, 
the applicable punishment, and the magnitude of the rewards. 
Nevertheless, more broadly, other research has shown that dishonest behavior also 
takes into consideration internal rewards, such as internalization of norms and values of 
society in which it operates (Campbell, 1964; Dilulio, 1996; Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, 
Camerer, Fehr, Gintis & McElreath, 2001; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 
2006; Ariely, 2012). 
The literature indicates that people have a strong belief in their own morality, value 
honesty, and want to keep this idea about their self-concept (Greenwald, 1980; Griffin & Ross 
1991; Sanitioso, Kunda & Fong, 1990). This means that in order to maintain internal morality 
standards, a person may lose financial benefits, but will retain his positive self-concepts 
(Harris, Mussen & Rutherford, 1976). This does not mean that the individual will always be 
honest in their decisions: Mazar and Ariely (2006) claim that each individual has a threshold 
of dishonesty; if dishonest acts do not affect this threshold, the dishonest behavior of the 
individual will be based on the cost-benefit external relation. However, when the dishonest act 
becomes very evident, that is, it exceeds this previously established limit, the internal 
mechanism of reward is activated and it exerts its influence on the external rewards. That 
way, even if the benefits of being dishonest exceeded their costs, the individual will be 
honest, based on his self-concept of honesty. However, if the external benefits become 
extremely high, it is possible for the individual to ignore their moral self-concept and choose 
to make a dishonest decision (Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 
2008). Therefore, in decisions about dishonesty, the individual takes into account not only the 
external rewards, the probability of being caught and the magnitude of the punishments, but 
also how the dishonest act causes him to change his own perceptions and self-concept. 
As noted by Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008), people do not exaggerate dishonesty – 
the authors call this an "incomplete lie" – just for the sake of maintaining their 
moralityandself-concept. In line with these findings, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), in 
a simple die-rolling, found that the participants reported values greater than those shown, in 
order to increase their individual remuneration. 
Thereby, some research has found that dishonest behavior is not always based on the 
maximization of profits, but rather that individuals are willing to refuse monetary benefits to 
behave in an extremely dishonest manner (Abeler, Becker & Falk, 2014; Cappelen, Sørensen 
& Tungodden, 2013; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Glätzle-
Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015; Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy; Rockenbach & Serra-Garcia, 2013; 
Kröll & Rustagi, 2016; Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe & Johannesson, 2009; Mazar & Ariely, 
2006; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Santos, 2011; Ariely, 2012). 
However, recent researches begun the study on dishonesty in groups (e.g. Baeker & 
Mechtel, 2015; Chytilová & Korbel, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013; Muehlheusser, Roider & 
Wallmeier, 2015; Sutter, 2009). Group decisions add a number of variables to the problem of 
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dishonesty: the first relates to the aggregate of individual preferences, yet the individuals may 
not have preferences that are completely aligned, but in the end, the group will make only one 
decision (Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017). Second, the group configuration may bring up 
social aspects that are relevant, such as whether rewards are standardized or not within the 
group, whether there is a possibility that one member may hide behind another, or even the 
social concerns. 
Wiltermuth (2011) showed that people are prone to deceive others when the benefits 
of doing so are divided with other people, even though they are unknown. Schweitzer 
and Hsee (2002) pointed out that people more readily justify their lies when others can benefit 
from dishonest behavior. Gneezy (2005) found that individuals tricked more often the 
greater the reward for lying and the lower the loss for the deceived person. 
Similarly, Mazar and Aggarwal (2011) have shown that, when individuals are 
embedded in a group, that is, their decisions are based on a collectivist mentality, they tend to 
behave more unethically (e.g. offering bribes), that they feel less responsible for their own 
actions. Thereby, committing dishonest acts seem to be easier in a group than individually 
because of the diffusion of responsibility, that is, the probability of cheating increases when 
unethical behavior is obscured (Bandura, 2014; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 
1996). Some experiments show that, on average, individuals, when inserted in a group, show 
higher levels of cooperation (Chen & Li, 2009) and lower levels of punishment (Mussweiler 
& Ockenfels, 2013). 
Based on existing studies, one can expect the groups to present more dishonest 
behavior than individuals for at least three reasons: first, the groups generally reason more 
than individuals (Kocher, Strauß & Sutter, 2006; Kocher & Sutter, 2005), that is, when they 
are involved in some collective work, members learn faster not only the characteristics of a 
given experiment being tested, but also in business life; they learn faster the characteristics of 
a given sector (e.g. enforcement, punishments), making them more susceptible to dishonest 
behavior (Sutter, 2009). 
Second, groups may be more dishonest, as it may be easier to disguise lies within a 
group compared to the individual, that is, psychologically, it may be easier to be dishonest in 
a group, because such a configuration promotes the diffusion of responsibility among its 
members (Conrads et al., 2013). 
And third, recent researches suggest that groups may be more dishonest because other 
individuals may also benefit from dishonest behavior (Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; Weisel & 
Shalvi, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002). That is, when the dishonest act 
benefits oneself and can benefit other agents too, the individual can justify the lie more easily, 
since, after all, he is doing something "good" for another member of the team, such as is the 
case of Wiltermuth's research (2011). 
Based on the research of Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017), Sutter (2009), Conrads 
et al. (2013), and Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) who claim that individuals are more 
likely to be dishonest when inserted into a group than individually, the following research 
hypothesis was elaborated: 
   
H1: Individuals are more dishonest when interacting with a group than individually. 
 
2.3 Experimental Design 
 
The experiment was based on the die-rolling test of Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013) and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017) and is divided into two stages. At each 
stage of the experiment, the participants watched a die-rolling on the computer screen. In the 
next screen, the participant should inform the number seen in the dice, choosing a number 
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from 1 (one) to 6 (six). The amount of points earned is linked to the number that the 
participant informed, and not to the real number launched (respondents will receive the same 
amount of points that they report), for example, if the respondent reports that the dice 
presented the number 3 (three), he will earn 3 (three) points. The number of points awarded 
corresponds to the number informed, and not to the number of the dice observed, giving room 
for dishonesty. Each point obtained is equivalent to BRL 1.00 (one real)1. In this way, the 
respondents can put any number between one and six, thus with the possibility of being 
dishonest. 
In the first stage of the experiment, the participants made their choices individually, 
that is, each participant watched the video with the die-rolling and answered the number 
without contacting any other person. At this stage of the experiment, the objective was to 
evaluate each person's dishonesty, individually, when they might take advantage of the rules 
and from the number reported. This is similar to the bonus that company executives receive, 
associated with the profit made: regardless of the actual number of profits that the company 
presented in a certain period, the executive can manipulate the real profit and disclose a 
fictitious profit, so that, he can pocket a higher value . 
In the second stage of the experiment, the influence of the group on the dishonesty of 
the individual was analyzed. For this, Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017) experiment was 
adapted, in which the participants were randomly divided into two groups: GroupPC and 
the GroupNoPC, as will be explained later. The order of the experiment (first individually, 
then in group) was chosen because it resembles day-to-day decision-making: initially, each 
person internalizes its behavior before making a collective decision. Table 1, illustrates 
the design of the experiment: 
  
       Table 1: Design of the first experiment 
Treatments 




                   Source: prepared by the authors. 
  
The participants randomly chosen by the system to compose the groups were divided 
into groups of three people and each watched, on their own computer, the same video with the 
die-rolling (so they all watched the same number). After watching the video, the group with 
the three participants had two minutes to discuss in an online chat. The chat allows free 
communication between participants without revealing their identities, allowing all members 
of the group to interact at the same time. The group interaction proposed in this part of the 
experiment resembles the collegiate decisions that are taken not only in Boards of Directors, 
Corporate Governance and Ethics Committees, but also to those who carry out the daily life 
of companies: in general, major decisions adopted by companies are not individual meetings, 
but through various stakeholder meetings. 
After the chat conversation, each participant reported the value observed in the dice, 
individually, on the computer screen. The focus will be about the form of remuneration of the 
participants: those who selected to participate in the GroupPC will only receive if all the 
members of the group inform the same value, regardless of the actual release of the dice. If at 
least one member of the group reports a different number, all three members receive zero 
points. That is, the members of the GroupPC will only pocket the money if all the members 
of the group inform the same number, regardless of the actual release: even if the dice has 
                                                          
1 To illustrate, at the time this the experiment was conducted, each BRL 1.00 equaled, on average to USD 0.31. 
And the minimum wage in Brazil corresponded to BRL 937.00, equivalent to USD 288.31. 
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informed the number 3 (three), if all the members of the GroupPC inform 6 (six), everyone 
will receive 6 (six); but if two members answer 6 (six) and only one inform 3 (three), 
everyone will receive 0 (zero) points. 
The difference between GroupPC and GroupNoPC resides in the form of 
remuneration given to the participants: even if there is group interaction, in the GroupNoPC, 
each participant will receive the amount reported, regardless of the number that other 
members of the group have reported. That is, members of the GroupNoPC will receive their 
remuneration independently from the values reported by the other members of the group: if 
two members inform 3 (three) and the other inform 6 (six), in that group category, each 
participant will receive the amount reported in the system, regardless of the others. 
As a matter of fact, there are two stages in the experiment that has the purpose to 
investigate the influence of the collective in the dishonesty of each individual: does the 
individual become more or less honest when his decision can influence the whole group? And 
when this decision does not influence the others, will only the influence of the group impact 
the decision in terms of honesty? 
Before starting the experiment, each participant answered personal questions, such as 
gender, study institution and family income, in order to obtain an overview of the 
respondents. During the experiment, each participant used a separate computer and no 
communication was allowed, except through the chat environment. Before each stage of the 
experiment, instructions were displayed on the computer screen for participants. In addition, a 
set of on-screen control questions ensured the understanding of the game: each stage only 
started after the participant answered the control questions correctly. Participants could fail 
repeatedly and the Applicator of the experiment was allowed to provide explanations. 
At the end of all stages of the experiment, the last screen showed the participant his 
identification code, how many points he got throughout the game, and the amount (in reais) of 
money pocketed. In each table, there was a paper with three blank spaces to be filled with 
information of the participant. Therefore, at the end of the experiment, each participant filled 
out the paper with the data reported in the last screen of the experiment, took the paper to 
the Applicator, who then delivered the corresponding amount. In this way, dishonesty can be 
verified in three different moments: a) in the first stage of the experiment, in which the 
participant played individually; b) in the second stage, after the interaction with the 
group; and c) in the third stage, when the participant puts in the paper the points and 
corresponding amount (in reais) to be earned at the end. 
Table 2 summarizes the stages of the experiment: 
  
Table 2 : Stages of the first experiment 
PHASES DESCRIPTION 
General Instructions 
Instructions are given to participants to guide them in the 
experiment, such as payment, anonymity and chat interaction. 
Questionnaire 
The participants answer a questionnaire with personal 
information, such as age, study institution, family income. 
PART 1 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
Instructions about the next stage of the experiment and they 
must respond correctly if they understood the given guidelines. 
Die-Rolling 
Participants watch (individually) a video with the die-rolling. In 
this stage, the video was the same for all the participants, 
presenting the number 3 (three). 
Decision making 
The participants individually report the result of dice, 




PART 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
The system automatically and randomly divides the participants 
into two groups (GroupPC and GroupNoPC) and sends 
instructions about the next step to each participant, taking into 
account the type of group they are inserted. Participants should 
also inform if they understood the task to be performed. 
Die-Rolling 
Participants watch (individually) a video with the die- 
rolling. Members of the same group watch the same video. Also 
in this step, the video is the same for all participants, presenting 
the number 1 (one). 
Instructions for group interaction 
Participants received instructions about how the chat will work, 
such as the time they would have to talk and the prohibition of 
identifying themselves. 
Group interaction 
Participants interact in a virtual chat, without identifying the 
other members of the group. 
Decision making 
The participants individually report the result of the data entry, 
considering that the remuneration is tied to the number they 
have informed and the group in which they are inserted. 
FINAL PART 
Payment 
The participant is informed of the sum of points and the amount 
in reais earned at the end of the experiment. The participant 
writes it down on the paper and delivers it to the Applicator to 
receive the corresponding remuneration. 
Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
The sessions of the experiment were carried out in the laboratory of the Federal 
Fluminense University, Volta Redonda campus, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, due to the 
accessibility, during the period of May 25
th
, 2017 to June 8
th
, 2017, with undergraduate 
students of the courses of Accounting, Administration and Public Administration. 
Data were collected in 19 rounds, with 310 participants in total. However, only 250 
responses were used in the research, due to problems presented, such as internet connection, 
which made it impossible for some participants to complete the experiment, and participation 
in the non-multiples group of 3: how the system formed groups with three participants 
exactly. When there were groups that was not multiple of 3, the system discarded the other 
participants and they only participated in the first stage of the experiment. Of the students 
enrolled in the Accounting course, data were collected from 72% of the students, and 58% of 
them were used. 
Each session lasted about 30 minutes (each participant took, on average, 8 minutes to 
complete the experiment) and the income spent was BRL 1,562.00, an average of BRL 5.68 
for each participant. The experiment was programmed and conducted through a software 
specially created for this research, through the link http://experiment-c10ad.firebaseapp.com. 
After the conclusion of the experiment, the conversations were also analyzed during 
the chat between the participants: they were divides by the groups (GroupPC and 
GroupNoPC) and elaborated wordclouds, through the site www.wordclouds.com.  The 
purpose was to verify the expressions used by the respondents during the conversations, and 
which were used the most. 
In addition, the McNemar statistical test was performed in order to compare the two 
samples and to verify if individuals are more dishonest when making group decisions than 
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individual ones. The choice of this test was due to the fact that it was composed of paired 
samples (for that reason the non-use of the Chi-Square test, despite the similarity) with 
categorical variables: the individuals were honest or dishonest. For this, IBM SPSS
®
 software, 




In the experiment, the two die-rolling tests were the same for all participants: in the 
first stage, the dice always presented the value 3 (three), and in the second, always the value 1 
(one). Thus, the individuals considered honest were those who presented a total of 4 (four) in 
their answers. No individual presented a value less than 4, nor greater than 12, because it was 
not allowed, since the system blocked the response by a maximum of 6 per stage. 
Of the 250 valid answers, 138 individuals were honest, that is, 55% of the participants 
reported 4 in the sum; therefore, 112 individuals were dishonest (45%). Of the 112 dishonest 




           Table 3: Overview of dishonest people 
Sum of points  Number of respondents Percentage 
5 10 9% 
7 19 17% 
8 8 7% 
9 42 38% 
10 3 3% 
11 5 4% 
12 25 22% 
Total 112 100% 
         Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
Of the 42 people who answered 9 points, only 1 reported 4 in the first stage and 5 in 
the second: all others were honest in the first step, reporting 3, and the maximum of 
dishonesty in the second stage, reporting 6. This result is consistent with previous researches 
(Kocher, Strauß & Sutter, 2006; Kocher & Sutter, 2005; Sutter, 2009; Conrads et al., 
2013; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; Weisel & Shalvi, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011; Schweitzer & 
Hsee, 2002) which claim that individuals may be more dishonest in group than individually 
due to factors such as faster learning when engaged in some collective work, ease of 
disguising lies and the ability to benefit others with dishonest behavior. Table 4 helps to 
understand the results: 
 
       Table 4: Matrix of responses – first experiment 
 Honest – part 2 Dishonest – part 2 
Honest – part 1 138 54 
Dishonest – part 1 54 37 
         Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
In addition, of the 112 people who were dishonest in this experiment, a part of them 
(54 people) were honest in the first stage, when they participated individually, and dishonest 
when interacting in a group. Another interesting fact relates to the individuals who reached 
the maximum level of individual dishonesty: those who reported 6 in the first stage of the 
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experiment, 34% (16 people) were honest in the second stage of the experiment, when they 
play in group. 
When comparing the results of the first stage of the experiment (when the participants 
made the decisions individually) with that of the second part (when the decision was taken in 
a group), it was verified that there was an increase in group dishonesty when confronted with 
individual decisions: 36% of people were dishonest in the second stage versus 23% 
dishonesty in the first part. 
Verifying whether this 13% increase in dishonesty when individuals make their 
decisions in a group is statistically significant compared to the individual level.  The 
McNemar test for dependent samples was performed, as can be seen from the data in the table 
below: 
 
  Table 5: McNemar statistics – first experiment 
Frequency Individual Group 
Honest 76,8% 63,6% 
Dishonest 23,2% 36,4% 
Chi-Square 13,653  
McNemar test 0,000  
N of valid cases 250  
                 Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
As McNemar's test presented a value lower than 0.05, this indicates that the null 
hypothesis of the test can be rejected, indicating that the increase in dishonesty seen in the 
frequency (from 23% to 36%) is really significant: the individuals analyzed in this experiment 
were more dishonest when they decided in group than individually. 
The experiment was performed in 250 people, 49% were women and 51% were 
men. Of the 122 women who participated, 45% were dishonest versus 44% men. 
Regarding the groups, 110 people (44%) participated in the GroupPC and 140 (56%), 
of the GroupNoPC, taking into account that the group was randomly chosen by the system. 
Of those who were in GroupPC, that is, all members of the group should report the same 
amount to receive, 48% were dishonest compared to 52% honest. In the GroupNoPC, 42% 
were dishonest, compared to 58% honest. Despite the small difference between the two 
groups (6%), it can be seen that the members of GroupPC were more dishonest than the 
members of the GroupNoPC, that is, when participants had to interact more, they only receive 
compensation if all members matched to inform the same release value (GroupPC), they were 
more dishonest than when the combination of the members was not needed for the payment 
(GroupNoPC). 
The McNemar test was also applied to the sample, in the categories gender, income 
and group type, PC or NoPC and the data are described in Table 6: 
 
Table 6: McNemar statistics by category – first experiment  
Frequency 
Men Women Income ≤ 5,000 Income > 5,000 GroupPC GroupNoPC 
Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 
Honest 78,1 60,9 75,4 66,4 76,5 63,1 77,5 64,8 77,3 62,7 76,4 64,3 
Dishonest 21,9 39,1 24,6 33,6 23,5 36,9 22,5 35,2 22,7 37,3 23,6 35,7 
McNemar  0,000  0,108  0,001  0,078  0,017  0,006 
N  128  122  179  71  110  140 
Cochran’Q  0,000  0,078  0,002  0,050  0,108  0,007 
Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
In all the classifications, there was an increase in the dishonesty of the individuals, 
however, statistical significance was found only in the categories men, individuals with 
incomes less or equal BRL 5,000.00 and in the groups (PC and NoPC), indicating that the 
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people inserted in these categories were more dishonest when they decided as a group rather 
than individually. 
In addition, some of the participants' reactions were interesting: a) because of 
connection problems, one participant was unable to participate in the second stage of the 
experiment; because of this, she got into confusion with the Applicator because "she had 
made little money"; b) 3 people showed regret that they had been dishonest at the time of 
receiving the money, but even so, they received the amount they reported; c) a participant had 
informed a 9, received the value, and after about 5 minutes, came back to the room and 
returned the difference (BRL 5.00) because he "felt guilty"; d) two people did not want to 
receive the money (they had been honest in the answers); e) most of the people believed that 
the experiment was about negotiation and persuasion strategies, not dishonesty (it was not 
reported that the experiment was about dishonesty so that there was no interference in the 
responses; it was reported that the experiment was about decision making); f) the participants 
justified dishonesty in different ways: "it was strategic"; "if I could win 12, why not?";"it was 
at the end of the month and I was broke." 
Through the analysis of the conversations in the chat, it was possible to elaborate a 
wordcloud, separating in the groups PC and NoPC: 
 
          Figure 1: Wordcloud first experiment- GroupPC and NoPC 
 
 










The GroupPC is characterized by the group in which the participants must put the 
same number displayed by the dice, otherwise they receive no points in the round. Through 
the wordcloud formed by the conversations carried out by the respondents of this group, a 
strong agreement among participants is seen in relation to the number they will put, through 
the predominance of the words "let", "put" and "number". Thus, it is possible to identify that 
there were agreements to choose the number to be informed by the participants, possibly with 
the intention of an all-win scenario. 
In the GroupNoPC, although the words "number" and "put" have also occurred, it was 
possible to verify more verbs in singular than in plural: possibly this phenomenon is due to 
the fact that, in this category, the participants did not have to enter the same number displayed 
by the dice, since they would earn money according to the numbers informed. 
In addition, some excerpts of dialogues have been removed from the chat: a) "because, 
in a company you can put anything in the balance, but you lose the credibility, right?!"; b) 
"nobody afterwards complain about corruption"; c) –"let's put 6" –"and ethics?" (laughs); d) 
"I chose 6 for the dice, and you?"; e) –"guys, I understood the test" –"me too, it is 
about honesty" –"yes, but there is a detail" –"must talk about the fame of the accountant to be 
corrupted" –"let's not talk here"; f) "I do not know if it's a 'character' test". 
Here is the summary of the experiment: 
a) Number of participants – 310 
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b) Number of usable data (sample) – 250 (only the respondents who went to the second 
phase of the experiment were used, if the number of people in the room was not a 
multiple of 3, the system discarded the remaining ones, in addition there were 
problems with internet connection, which made it impossible for some participants to 
conclude the experiment); 
c) Number of dishonest people – 112 (45%) 
d) Average amount received – BRL 5.68 
e) Average amount received from the "dishonest" – BRL 9.02 
f) Average time taken to complete the experiment, per participant – 8 minutes 
g) Average attempts to understand the experiment, per participant – 2 
h) Total amount spent – BRL 1,562.00 




 The standard economic approach suggests that individuals are dishonest if the pros 
(especially financial ones) outweigh the cons (punishments). However, the results obtained 
from this experiment showed that the decision regarding dishonesty takes into account 
internal factors of each person, retaining their moral self-concepts. 
              The results of the experiment showed that less than half (45%) of the individuals 
were dishonest, although they had the opportunity to do so without suffering any kind of 
punishment and with their identities preserved. This shows that the decision on dishonesty 
may not be taken rationally, maximizing gains over costs but rather, consistent with the 
research of Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008), Mazar and Ariely (2006) and Ariely (2012), that 
individuals believe in their own morality and seek to maintain the idea of their self-concept, 
even though they lose financial benefits to maintain their positive self-concepts (Harris, 
Mussen & Rutherford, 1976). 
              Although individuals generally behaved more honestly than dishonestly, when 
confronted with the two stages of the experiment, individuals were found to be more 
dishonest in groups (36%) than individually (23%), which corroborates the research 
hypothesis in which individuals are more dishonest when making decisions in group than 
alone. These findings are in line with previous researches that found that groups present more 
dishonest behavior than individuals (Kocher, Strauß & Sutter, 2006; Kocher & Sutter, 2005; 
Sutter, 2009; Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017; Conrads et al., 2013; Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013). 
              Possible justifications for presenting more honest rather than dishonest behaviors 
may have been observed as a result of learning: since the experiment was carried out in a 
single university, students may have communicated with each other and the following 
participants have already done the experiment with an idea of what it was about. Moreover, in 
some rounds, the Applicator of the experiment was a teacher of the department which may 
have inhibited participants from responding dishonestly, for fear of suffering some kind of 
punishment or being discovered. 
One of the limitations of this research concerns its own design: as in the first stage of 
the experiment, the number seen in the dice was 3, and in the second stage, when the 
participants played in groups, the dice showed the number 1, this could have done with the 
participants being more dishonest in the second part than in the first. That is, the increase of 
dishonesty in the second part may have happened due to the increased benefit of dishonesty 
and not necessarily by the group element. One of the possibilities of verification would be to 
carry out a new experiment where half of the participants received 3 in the first part and the 
other half receives 1, to verify if there would be change in the dishonesty. However, the 
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analysis of the extracts of the conversations carried out in the chats and the elaboration of the 
wordclouds support the hypothesis that the group component influenced the decisions of the 
individuals in which they combined the number that they would inform, aiming at the 
maximization of the payoff. 
              For future researches, it is recommended that this same experiment be expanded not 
only in other courses but also in universities from different regions in order to provide an 
overview of the dishonest behavior of Brazilian students (future decision-makers in 
companies), especially when they interact in a group. Another suggestion is also to increase 
the number of people in each group so that the experiment might resemble the decision-
making in real-life companies, because in the real life, the number of people engaging in 
dishonesty acts can vary greatly. In addition, the proposed experiment model can be enhanced 
by including possible dishonest elements (the influence of a leader) as well as inhibitors 
(auditing). 
              The results presented in this paper reinforce the idea that, both in groups and 
individually, internal considerations are important when making decisions about 
dishonesty. This can help to understand the motivators that lead people to be dishonest as well 
as to seek mechanisms that are capable of inhibiting this behavior. 
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3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE LEADER IN THE BEHAVIOR OF THE GROUP 
  
 The study of the role of leadership within companies has become a challenge to be 
addressed in order to understand behavioral phenomena within a corporation. A number of 
corporate corruption scandals have surfaced in the media recently involving not only 
company officials but also senior officials. Knowing that leadership has a fundamental role of 
influence in its leaders, the objective of this research was to analyze if the existence of an 
individual in a situation of superiority (as a boss or a leader) would influence the dishonest 
behavior of a group. For this, an experiment was carried out with 180 students, in November 
2017 at the University of Brasília, based on the works of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 
(2013) and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2016). In the experiment, the participants should 
inform the number shown by the data, and their remuneration was tied to the number 
informed and not to the number seen, making dishonesty possible. First, the respondents made 
decisions collectively, and second, under the influence of a leader, whose pay was doubled 
before the others. The results found that individuals were more dishonest when they were 
under the influence of a leader (44%) than when they were not (36%). Although the research 
has some limitations, such as the leader's random choice or even the absence of a coercive 
mechanism on the other participants, it is proposed to be an initial step in the search for 




The study about leadership in business has become a challenge to be addressed in 
order to understand the behavioral phenomena that occur in an organization. Regarding 
leadership, in the areas of administration, sociology, psychology and anthropology, several 
researches have been conducted in order to understand its effects on organizations (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978; Yukl, 2002; Bass, 1990; Siqueira & Amaral, 2006; Lucas, Diener & Suh, 1996; 
Sparrowe & Liden, 1997; Mueller & Lee, 2002). 
The concept of leader can be understood as the person who has great responsibility, 
able to solve problems and balance the different personalities that reside in a work 
environment, through their experience and knowledge (Cooke, 2000). Because of this 
connection between leader and led, the psychological well-being of employees is associated 
with the management model adopted by the organization, that is, the company's human capital 
is under constant influence of its leaders, whether these are positive or negative influences. 
Yukl (2002) understands leadership as a process of mutual influence between leader 
and led, the actions taken by both the leader and the ones led are the basis of a mutual 
relationship in which both are influenced. Being the people responsible for deciding, creating 
and innovating within a company, the continuous investment in the human capital of 
organizations, in relationships and interpersonal exchanges is of vital importance. 
For a company to be considered ethical, it is necessary for its employees to perform 
ethical actions. If the leader is able to influence his/her employees, it is imperative, for a 
company that seeks transparency in its processes, to have ethical leaders (Sá, 2001). 
Recently, a number of corporate corruption scandals have become prominent, 
especially through unethical practices taken by top corporate executives. Internationally, cases 
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such as Enron, WorldCom, Volkswagen, Deutsche Bank and WalMart have an impact not 
only on the industry but also on the local economy. The Brazilian case involving large 
companies like Petrobras, Furnas and companies in the construction industry (e.g. OAS, 
Odebrecht, Queiroz Galvão) not only damage the advancing in several national projects, 
especially connected to infrastructure, but also affects the politics and unemployment in the 
country. All these corruption scandals have in common the fact that these dishonest attitudes 
were not committed by a single individual but by a group of members of the company, in 
which, in many cases, were the ones leading. 
In the international literature, there are studies on dishonesty committed by groups of 
people (Charness & Sutter, 2012; Sutter, 2009; Kugler et al., 2007; Fischbacher & Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013; Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017), but none that puts the leader on the spotlight. 
Against the recent scandals of corruption involving companies, in which are involved 
several people in the company, including the leaders, and knowing that the leadership has a 
key role of influence in their team, the following research problem arose: What is the 
influence of the leader about the dishonest behavior of the groups? 
              Thereby, the purpose of this research is to analyze whether the existence of an 
individual in a position of superiority (e.g., boss or high executive) would influence the 
dishonest behavior of a group. To achieve this objective, the methodology of die-rolling, 
suggested in the studies of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Kocher, Schudy and 
Spantig (2017) will be used and adapted. In previous work on dishonesty, none of them tested 
the leader's element and his possible influence on the decision of the others, which makes this 
research substantially different from the others. 
              This paper is structured as follows: the next section presents the theoretical 
foundation, regarding the concepts about the Theory of Marginal Utility, Prospect Theory and 
organizational financial fraud; then the research methodology, the details of the experiment 
and its stages, as well as the sample composition; then the results of the study are presented; 
and, finally, the conclusions. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
  
In the XVIII and XIX centuries, scholars emerged with the desire to research the effect 
of psychology on finance, but it was only in the XX century, on the occasion of the 
Neoclassical Revolution, that it took place. Thereby, there are three main Theories of Finance: 
a) The Traditional Theory of Finance (TTF) which consists of the understanding that the 
market is irrational and the efficient investor is the one with speculative vision and invests in 
assets that provide above average returns; b) Modern Finance Theory (MTF), also known as 
Neoclassical, has the assumption that the man is rational, uses quantitative tools to prove his 
studies and relies heavily on the Theory of Marginal Utility and The Theory of Efficient 
Markets; and, at last, c) Behavioral Finance Theory (BFT) based on the idea that man is not 
completely rational, instead, much of his decisions are irrationally made, influenced by 
emotions and cognitive errors. 
As stated, MTF has as its basic assumption the view that man decides rationally (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and his studies are based on the Theory of Marginal Utility. 
According to this theory, the value of an item is not determined by a price, but by the its 
utility, and this can be different for individuals. Moreover, based on this theory, the agent 
makes the risky decisions through a rational analysis, being risk averse and seeking to 
maximize the expected utility (Bernoulli, 1954). In this way, the investor will always make 
rational decisions aimed at maximizing the usefulness of the item. 
However, even the classical scholars of the Modern Theory of Finance were already 
challenging the full rationality advocated by the model (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; 
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Damodaran, 2006), noting the frequency with which speculative bubbles have appeared in the 
market and the resulting collapses.Therefore, the authors suggest the existence of other 
phenomena in the markets that cannot be explained by the premise of rationality (Ferreira, 
2016). 
Simon (1957) was one of the pioneers in the study of limited rationality: he proposed 
the idea of replacing the maximization of utility expected by a truer view of human capacity, 
considering the complexity of decisions made by individuals and companies. Based on these 
assumptions, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed the Prospect Theory, being a 
landmark for the Economy and for the Behavioral Finances. 
In Prospect Theory, when an individual needs to make a decision that involves risk, it 
goes through two phases of thinking: editing (in which information is deciphered and 
simplified) and evaluation (in which the alternatives are compared and the one with larger 
value is chosen). However, the decision-making process is influenced by the preferences of 
the individual, which causes anomalies in their decisions (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979). 
While the expected results in the Theory of Marginal Utility can be weighted by their 
probability of occurrence, Prospect Theory reveals that individual preferences violate this 
axiom and this result can be altered by a series of anomalies. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) then carried out a study presenting two problems in 
which situations presented similar solutions by the theory developed by Bernoulli (1954), 
since the "expected value" in both cases was equivalent. However, the authors realized that 
people in general are averse to risk in the case of gains and bet on the risk in case of losses. 
That is, people feel more the pain of loss than pleasure with an equivalent gain (Melo, 2014). 
The Prospect Theory, therefore, brings out three points which violate the axioms of 
theory marginal utility: the first is that individuals' decisions are taken on the basis of profit 
and loss, and not from the equity variation; second, the utility function is concave with respect 
to gains and convex with respect to losses (the graph of the value function is represented by 
an asymmetric function in S); and, finally, individuals feel more the pain of loss than the 
pleasure of gain. 
Thus, through traditional economic theory, the individual would commit dishonest acts 
based on the maximization of marginal utility, taking into account aspects such as the benefits 
of dishonest behavior, punishments, and the risk of being caught (Becker, 1968). These 
assumptions consider only external aspects to the individual, however, the psychology, the 
sociology and behavioral economics also consider internal aspects as influencing the decision 
making of individuals, about dishonesty. Nowadays, the current legal system is based on the 
Theory of Marginal Utility, which considers factors to inhibit corruption and fraudulent acts, 
increased detection or applicable punishment, being more effective in increasing detection 
than in punishment (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003; Melo Segundo, 2016). 
Recent studies (Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Ariely, 2012) 
have shown that individuals have self-concepts about self-honesty, which is taken into 
account when making decisions. That is, even if the proposal meets the assumptions of 
modern economic theory (great benefits by fraud, no probability of being detected or low 
punishment) people do not cheat to the fullest, for they respect an existing threshold internally 
of their own view of honesty. This behavior is similar to that described by Freud about the 
part of the brain called Superego, which represents the social norms within the mind of each 
individual, capable of punishing or rewarding him for each attitude (Mazar & Ariely, 2006). 
The literature is rich in relation to the study of individual dishonesty (Mazar, Amir & 
Arely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; Santos, 2011; Castillo et al., 
2014; Lima, Avelino & Cunha, 2017; Tomazelli, 2011; Abeler, Becker & Falk, 2014; Ruffle 
& Tobol, 2014; Lewis, Bardis, Flint, Mason, Smith, Tickle & Zinser, 2012; Lundquist et al., 
2009; Childs, 2012). 
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Internationally, authors have verified that people behave more dishonestly in a group 
than individually (Baeker & Mechtel, 2015; Chytilová & Korbel, 2014; Conrads et al., 2013; 
Muehlheusser, Roider & Wallmeier, 2015; Sutter, 2009; Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi, 2013; 
Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017) and factors such as the division of responsibility 
(Wiltermuth, 2011; Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011), likelihood of benefitting other individuals 
(Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002) and the decrease in loss for the deceived person (Gneezy, 2005) 
influence dishonest behavior. There are few researches about this theme and none about the 
leader worldwide. 
With the growing corruption scandals in companies, involving groups of people, and 
given the still incipient research in the literature on collective dishonesty, it is necessary to 
study this. In addition, no research has been found that analyzed the influence of the leader in 
this dishonest behavior, however, it is important to verify this factor, since the leader has 
power to interfere over the other members of an organization. 
With more than a century of scientific research about this theme (Bass, 2008) and 
being one of the most studied topics in Social Sciences (Day & Antonakis, 2012), leadership 
is present in several everyday scenarios, not only in companies, as well as in schools or in any 
social groups. Therefore, studying the role of leadership in social dynamics is of fundamental 
importance for understanding collective achievements (Turano & Cavazzote, 2016), 
especially as it is fundamental in creating value for companies (Schein, 2007) and in the 
execution of strategies of the organizations (Kotter, 2001). 
According to Burns (1978) there are more than 130 different definitions of leadership. 
However, there is consensus on some aspects that characterize leadership (Turano & 
Cavazzote, 2016): a) dynamic interaction between leaders and followers; b) a process of 
influence; c) promotion of some degree of transformation in a given social context; and d) the 
pursuit of specific goals or objectives. That is, leaders are able to influence the ones they lead 
to achieve the desired goals, either honestly or dishonestly. 
The leader figure has the power to influence people, whether positively or negatively, 
and the dishonest decisions made by members of a company are responsible for the growing 
corporate corruption scandals. Knowing that decision making is not something purely rational 
and this process suffers from anomalies arising from the preferences of each individual, the 
following research hypotheses are presented: 
 
H2: Honesty of the group is influenced by the presence of the leader. 
 
3.3 Experimental Design 
              
To achieve the objective of the research, which consists of analyzing if the existence 
of a leader influences the dishonest behavior of a group, the experiment will be used and 
adapted, based on a die-rolling test of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Kocher, 
Schudy and Spantig (2017). The experiment is divided into two stages, in which participants 
watched a video with the die-rolling and given, on the next screen, the number seen. The 
remuneration of the participants is linked to the number informed and not to the number seen, 
thus enabling them to be dishonest in their responses. 
Throughout the experiment, the participants were divided into two types of groups, 
each consisting of three people: GroupPC and GroupNoPC. The difference between the 
groups consists in the form of remuneration: those who belong to GroupPC must inform the 
same number of the dice; if at least one member reports a different number, all other members 
of the group earn zero points. In GroupNoPC, the remuneration is individual, that is, each 




In the first stage of the experiment the individuals observed, on the computer screen, 
the die-rolling and then had two minutes to talk with the other members of the group through 
an online chat. Later, they informed the number, taking into account what was spoken during 
the chat. At no time were the participants allowed to identify with the other members of the 
group or to mention any information that facilitated the identification. 
 In the second stage of the experiment, the members of the group remain the same, 
however a member has been chosen by the system, randomly, as the leader of the others. The 
leader has received information on this position and also about his/her differentiated 
remuneration (the leader receives double the points he/she reports), however, it will be at the 
discretion of the leader to comment with the other members of the group about their position 
and/or remuneration, through chat: members of the group who are not leaders, are aware of 
the existence of one, but do not know exactly who the leader is; it is up to him to choose 
whether or not to mention this information to the others. The inclusion of a leader in the group 
is aimed at verifying whether this individual will encourage or discourage the other members 
of the group, or if there is any kind of change in their own degree of dishonesty, from the 
moment that some trust is given to him due to its position. 
For exemplifying, assuming there are three members in a group characterized as 
GroupPC, and all group members report the value 5 (five) for a die-rolling, the leader will 
receive 10 (ten) points, while the other members of the group will receive only 5 (five) points. 
This differentiated remuneration also resembles the gains that leaders obtained in companies: 
in general, executives at management positions receive a differentiated remuneration of the 
other employees, as an incentive to their work. 
It is important to emphasize that there are limitations on the figure of the leader 
inserted in this experiment, because, in the presented context, the leader is assigned randomly 
by the system: people may not be prepared for this function to end up exercising it, unlike 
what happens on the day-to-day business, although the lucky element is a possibility in the 
management of a company (Liu & De Rond, 2016). In addition, the leaders in the experiment 
also do not have the power to decide on the group, only through persuasion and the other 
members of the group will only know who the leader is if the leader warns them, these factors 
could diminish the influence of the leader over his subordinates, a fact that is different from 
that presented in daily life, so these questions present themselves as a limitation in the design 
of the experiment. 
Table 7 assists in visualizing the design of the experiment: 
 
      Table 7: Design of the second experiment 
Treatments 
Part 1 (without leader) Part 2 (with leader) 
GroupPC GroupPC 
GroupNoPC GroupNoPC 
   Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
  Throughout the experiment, communication between the participants was not allowed 
(except during the chat). Before each stage of the experiment, the respondents received 
instructions on the computer screen about the following instructions and also had to answer 
the questions about understanding the next stage. The participants just had access to the 
following steps when they respond properly to control questions. 
Before starting the experiment, each participant also answered personal questions such 
as gender, study institution and family income, in order to obtain an overview of the 
respondents. At the end of the experiment, appeared on the computer the sum of the points 
that the participant has achieved, its identification code, and the amount, in reais, to be 
received, being that each point equals BRL 1.00 (one real). The participant then, transcribed 
this data in the paper located on their desk, hand it over to the Applicator of the experiment 
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that gave the amount in cash. Thus, the participant sees different opportunities to be 
dishonest: in the first stage of the experiment, in the second and at the moment of 
transcription of the amount on the paper. 
Table 8, helps in understanding the experiment: 
 
Table 8: Stages of the second experiment 
PHASES DESCRIPTION 
General Instructions 
Instructions are given to the participants to guide them how to 
proceed in the experiment, such as pay, anonymity and chat 
interaction. 
Questionnaire 
The participants answer a questionnaire with personal 
information, such as age, study institution, family income. 
PART 1 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
The system automatically and randomly divides the participants 
into the two groups (GroupPC and GroupNoPC) and sends 
instructions on the next step to each participant, taking into 
account the type of group to which it is inserted. Participants 
should also inform if they understood the task to be performed. 
Die-Rolling 
Participants watch (individually) a video with the die-rolling. In 
this stage, the video was the same for all the participants 
presenting the number 1 (one). 
Instructions for group interaction 
Participants received instructions about how the chat will work, 
such as the time they would have to talk and the prohibition of 
identifying themselves. 
Group interaction 
Participants interact in a virtual chat, without the possibility of 
identifying the other members of the group. 
Decision Making 
The participants individually report the result of dice, 
considering that the remuneration is tied to the number they 
report. 
PART 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
Participants remain divided into the same group in which they 
answered part 1 of the experiment, however, one member of 
each group is chosen, automatically and randomly by the 
system, to be the leader. Instructions are given about how to 
proceed in the next step and respond if they have understood the 
task. 
Die-Rolling 
Participants watch (individually) a video with the die-
rolling. Members of the same group watch the same video. Also 
in this step, the video is the same for all participants, presenting 
the number 2 (two). 
Instructions for group interaction 
Participants received instructions about how the chat will work, 
such as the time they would have to talk and the prohibition of 
identifying themselves. 
Group interaction 
Participants interact in a virtual chat, without the possibility of 
identifying the other members of the group. 
Decision making. 
The participants individually report the result of the data entry, 
considering that the remuneration is tied to the number they 
inform and the group in which it is inserted. 
FINAL PART 
Payment 
The participant is informed of the sum of points and the amount 
of reais he received at the end of the experiment. The participant 
write these amounts down on paper and delivers them to the 
Applicator to receive their remuneration. 




The sessions of the experiment were carried out in the computer lab of the University 
of Brasília (UnB), Darcy Ribeiro campus, in Brasília, Federal District, as a result of the 




, 2017, with undergraduate students in Accounting 
Sciences. 
Data were collected in 17 rounds, with 180 participants in total, with mean age of 22 
years. As the system did not present failures in its execution, all the answers were used in the 
research. Each session of the experiment lasted about 45 minutes (from the preparation of the 
experiment, providing instructions to the participants until delivery of the value received), 
each participant took an average of 15 minutes to complete the experiment. 
The total amount spent, in reais, was BRL 1,275.00, an average of BRL 7,08 for each 
participant. The experience was programmed and conducted through the online software, 
created especially for this research, and can be accessed through the link http://experiment-
parte2.firebaseapp.com. 
Afterwards, the conversations that the participants carried out in the chats were also 
analyzed: the conversations were divided in the groups (PC and NoPC) and wordclouds  were 
elaborated, through the site www.wordclouds.com. The purpose of making these clouds was 
to identify the most used words in the dialogues and if these expressions could somehow help 
in the interpretation of the data. 
To test the hypothesis of the research, the McNemar test, a non-parametric test, was 
performed in IBM SPSS
®
 software (version 20), which aims to analyze, in dependent samples 
and categorical variables, whether there was a significant difference between the two 




In the experiment, all participants watched the same video with the die-rolling: in the 
first part, the dice presented the value 1 (one) and, in the second part, the value was 2 (two). 
This means that non-leaders whose total points at the end of the experiment had a value 
greater than 3 (three) were dishonest in their responses. Leaders, as their score was doubled in 
the second stage of the experiment, should receive a score of 5 (five) to be considered honest. 
The system did not allow the participant to enter a number greater than 6 (the largest 
number found in a dice), so the maximum dishonesty for non-leader participants was 12 
(twelve), and for the leaders participants was 18 (eighteen). 
At the end of the experiment, 56% of respondents were dishonest in the answers (101 
people) and 44% were honest (79 people). This means that, of the BRL 1,275.00 spent on 
remuneration to the participants, BRL 615.00 was paid for the dishonesty of the respondents; 
if everybody was honest, the expense would be BRL 660.00. 
When the analysis is performed by each part of the experiment, it is possible to 
perceive an increase in dishonesty when a leader was inserted in the group: in the first stage of 
the experiment, when there was still no leader, 36% (65) of the participants were dishonest; in 
the second stage, with the leader, 44% (80) were dishonest. These data show that the honesty 
of the group is influenced by the behavior of the leader, indicating that the leader influenced 
those led, being the basis of this relationship (Yukl, 2002; Cooke, 2000). 
Interesting information concerns the 115 participants who were honest in the first 
stage of the experiment, when in a group, but without the influence of the leader: 31% of 
them, that is, 36 participants were dishonest in the second stage. Moreover, all these 36 
respondents were honest the first stage indicating that the dice had shown the number 1, and 
were thoroughly dishonest in the second stage, indicating that the dice displayed the number 
6, while the same number 2 was presented on the screen. These data were compiled and are 




       Table 9: Matrix of responses – second experiment 
 Honest – part 2 Dishonest – part 2 
Honest – part 1 79 36 
Dishonest – part 1 21 44 
         Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
In order to test whether the increase in dishonesty from 36% to 44% , due to the 
presence of the leader, is significant, the non-parametric McNemar test was performed and the 
following data were obtained: 
 
                                      Table 10: McNemar statistics – second experiment 
Frequency Without leader With leader 
Honest 63,9% 55,6% 
Dishonest 36,1% 44,4% 
Chi-Square 3,439  
McNemar test 0,063  
N of valid cases 180  
          Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
The McNemar test did not present statistical significance (0.063) at 5%. In these cases, 
where the McNemar test displays a close value, it is necessary to perform another test with a 
more powerful performance, such as the Cochran’s Q test. In doing so, it was possible to 
verify a p-value of 0.047, so one could reject the null hypothesis of the test and assume that, 
for the sample surveyed, individuals were more dishonest with the influence of the leader than 
without this influence. 
The experiment was performed in 180 people, 51% are men and 49% are women. Of 
the 92 men who participated, 62% were dishonest, while 50% of the women were dishonest. 
Both genders were more dishonest in the second stage of the experiment (with the leader) than 
in the first, with a dishonesty increase of 11% among men and 6% among women. 
Regarding the leader, 32% of the participants performed this function during the 
experiment and the data showed that 60% of leaders were dishonest in their answers, 
compared with 40% of non-dishonest leaders. 
Considering the groups, 78 people (43%) participated in the GroupPC, which is where 
all the participants must inform the same number of the die-rolling to receive the 
remuneration, and 102 people (57%) were part of the GroupNoPC, where the choice of the 
group is performed automatically by the system, randomly. Of those who were part of the 
GroupPC, 55% were dishonest compared to 58% of dishonesty in the GroupNoPC. Although 
there were differences in the form of gratification between the groups, the difference was not 
great, presenting a value 3% higher for the group in which the combination of the value to be 
informed was not necessary. 
The McNemar test was also applied to the sample, in the categories gender, income 
and group type, PC or NoPC and the data are described in Table 11: 
 
Table 11: McNemar statistics by category – second experiment  
Frequency 
Men Women Income ≤ 5,000 Income > 5,000 GroupPC GroupNoPC 
Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 
Honest 60,9 50 67,0 61,4 66,2 56,3 62,4 55,0 64,1 59,0 63,7 52,9 
Dishonest 39,1 50 33,0 38,6 33,8 43,7 37,6 45,0 35,9 41,0 36,3 47,1 
McNemar  0,110  0,424  0,189  0,243  0,585  0,052 
N  92  88  71  109  78  102 
Cochran’Q  0,077  0,317  0,127  0,182  0,465  0,034 




In addition, some participants had some peculiar reactions: a) a boy wrote down all the 
stages of the experiment while playing and he said he wanted to know more about the 
program; b) a girl, when leaving, asked the Applicator if, in case she placed 12, she would 
win BRL 12.00; when she had an affirmative answer, the girl informed that she should have 
put 12; c) two girls reported that, if they could, they would return in the next day's rounds 
only to receive BRL 12.00; d) a boy asked if the experiment was about honesty because he 
thought about being honest; e) only one person did not accept to receive the money (this 
person was honest); f) a teacher, who gave up the space of his class for the experiment, was 
amazed at how people left the laboratory happily; g) a man, who had earned BRL 13.00, 
waited for the Applicator at the exit to return the money as soon as it knew that the money 
belonged to the project participants; the Applicator did not accept the return; h) a person 
entered the experiment to play, outside the hours of the rounds; there was no damage to the 
data because the system is locked; i) before beginning a round of the experiment, the space-
giving teacher would talk to the students about ethics and they would also discuss about this; 
a student mentioned that he worked for years in one of the companies that today are involved 
in corruption schemes in Brazil, and even the CEO is arrested (the student said to be a 
personal friend of this CEO), but he resigned the company after the schemes were discovered 
because he did not agree with the money destinations; at the end of the experiment, this same 
student had put the maximum value of dishonesty (as he was the leader, he received BRL 
18.00); j) the majority of the participants believed that the experiment was even about 
dishonesty (at no time was it informed to them about what the experiment really was, at the 
risk of influencing the answers, the participants were informed that it was an experiment 
about decision making); only a few believed that it was about persuasion. 
Through the analysis of the conversations in the chat, it was possible to elaborate 
wordclouds, in which they were separated by the groups, PC and NoPC: 
 
 
  Figure 2: Wordcloud second experiment - GroupPC and NoPC 
 












The GroupPC is the group in which the participants must place the same number of 
the die-rolling, otherwise the group participants receive 0 (zero) points. By the wordcloud 
formed through the conversations in the chat, it is possible to identify the predominance of the 
words "number" (being the most mentioned: 54 times) and "leader" (mentioned 16 times). 
This may indicate a combination of the participants in that group with respect to the number 
that they will report on the computer, indicating possible agreements between members to 
inform the same number of the dice and to obtain greater gains in the game. In addition, the 




In the GroupNoPC, in which there was no need to combine the votes, since each 
participant would receive the amount of points informed, regardless of the ones chosen by the 
other members of the group, there was the preponderance of the words "number" (mentioned 
84 times), and "leader" (21 times), which also indicates a strong combination of values to be 
described and the influence of the leader in this combination. In both groups was 
characterized the union of the members to indicate only a number referring to the die-rolling, 
and it is possible to observe the predominance of the words "number", "put", "points", "value" 
and "appeared" in the dialogues. 
Additionally, some excerpts from the dialogues made by the participants were taken 
from the chat: a) "Do you think the game rewards honesty? Or the highest number of 
points?"; b) "It will be nice is if it is a test of honesty and we take zero"; c) "Do you want to 
earn money or be honest?"; d) "–and then, we must decide if we say that it is 1 or if it is more, 
to receive the money. What are we going to choose?" "–I want money!"; e) "–Let’s put 6" "–
Ok, 6" "–We lose nothing, at most we get more points"; f) "then we should all put 6 because it 
is worth more"; g) "–We are all corrupt" "–I realize this"; h) "–We combine at 6, again?" "–
We have to follow the given task, we cannot think only about the result" "–More or less" "–
We can do whatever we want” “–It's a matter of making the same decision" "–It certainly has 
nothing to do with  honesty test" "–I think it does not have any problem being different to the 
die-rolling" "–That’s because: there’s no penalty, nor does it affect other people negatively 
""–I think what is being tested here is if we make the same decision and if we keep it and also 
in the explanation, and another in our answer"; i) "I think we have to be honest, we should 
keep ourselves honest. I am the leader'' “–Last group gained less by being honest LOL" "–So, 
I follow the leader then. Honesty, isn’t it?" "–Always, honest people earn less""–We do not 
disagree, because no one gain anything"; j) "I think that honesty can be part of the game"; k) 
"I think the idea is to test the will to make money"; l) "–this is a test where you earn more if 
you lie" "– Let’s bet higher?" "–So, 6""–Ok!"; m) "–here’s the deal, it is 6 for all stages and 
it’s over"; n) "– as far as I understand, all we have to do is 2 of us to inform the number (6), 
which is the maximum amount the points and the other report the correct number. And in the 
end we share everything equally" "–But it would not be honest, right?!" "–I think this is just 
the proposal" "–I'll go for the correct one then and you will the 6"; o) "–you're sure to get 
caught, but do you want to see what?" "–The honesty in decision-making"; p) "–let's get the 
evening snack"; q) "–What is this test testing? Your power to lie? Be honest or not?" "–It's a 
decision, too." 
The extract seen in dialogue (h) expresses an exemplified way what has been shown in 
previous works: one participant tries to convince others to be dishonest, justifying, mainly, 
that there is no penalty for their dishonest behavior and that does not penalize them. Bandura 
(2014), Bandura et al. (1996) and Conrads et al. (2013) have already identified this type of 
behavior in earlier researches, claiming that it seems easier to commit dishonest acts in group 
by the diffusion of responsibility and the possibility of unethical behavior being obscured. 
Here are some summary data about the experiment: 
a) Number of participants – 180 
b) Average age – 22 years old 
c) Number of dishonest people – 101 (56%, 36% without the leader, 44% with the 
leader) 
d) Average total amount received – BRL 7.08 
e) Average amount received from "dishonest" participants – BRL 9.94 
f) Average time taken to complete the experiment, per participant – 15 minutes 
g) Average nº of attempts to understand the experiment, per participant – 2 in each 
step 
h) Total amount spent – BRL 1,275.00 
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i) Amount spent more for dishonesty – BRL 615.00        
            
3.5 Conclusions 
 
Unlike the Traditional Finance Theory and the Modern Finance Theory, Behavioral 
Finance Theory is based on the assumption that people do not make their decisions in a 
completely rational way, but rather are influenced by emotions and cognitive errors. Within 
organizations, an important element that is capable of influencing the behavior of others is the 
leader, not only through their inherent power of persuasion, but also by their position over 
other collaborators. 
The results found in this research identify that when there is a figure of a leader in a 
group, people tends to take more dishonest decisions than without the leader. When faced 
with a situation in which dishonesty was an option, 36% of the participants chose to be 
dishonest when the decision was to be taken in a group, in which all members had the same 
hierarchical functions in the group. When an element in top position is inserted and this 
element receives double the remuneration, the percentage of dishonesty people raised to 44% 
of the total. 
These data show that when one individual is in a position of superiority over others 
(leader), this influences the dishonest behavior of the whole group, making their decisions 
more dishonest than without his presence. That is, in some way, the existence of a leader 
influences the other participants, either by the persuasion that it exerts, by the motivation or 
even by the power of control. 
Although research data have shown that a leader's influence interferes with dishonest 
behavior, this study has some limitations regarding the leadership component: the leader was 
chosen randomly by the system, which can lead to the choice of someone who is not prepared 
and/or do not feel comfortable with this position; in addition, leaders also have no coercive 
power over other participants, which differs substantially from the reality of companies, 
where bosses have a relative interference by maintaining the employment of their 
subordinates. 
In addition, a study could be conducted with different types of leaders in an attempt to 
better understand the influence of the leader in the decision making process of the other 
members of the group. For this, the ideal would be to place three types of leaders: in the first 
situation, the leader receives the same remuneration as the other participants, that is, there is 
no difference in the payment; in the second, a similar situation with the present experiment, in 
which the leader receives double, causing an incentive to the dishonest leaders; and the third 
situation, in which leaders receive moreindependent of the informed value, just by being a 
leader, could encourage honest leaders. 
Aware of these limitations, the present research proposes to be an initial step in the 
search for understanding the role of the leader in the dishonest behavior of individuals, 
leaving room for future research to fill these gaps and to deepen the findings of this study. 
Further, possible mechanisms that inhibit the dishonesty can be tested in order to find ways to 
reduce them in companies and also in society. 
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4  INHIBITOR MECHANISMS OF GROUP AND INDIVIDUALS’S DISHONESTY 
 
Initially, Becker's (1968) studies found that individuals make dishonest decisions 
based on the analysis of a rationality tripod, in which they analyze the benefits they would 
receive from the action, the applicable punishment, and the risk of being discovered. If the 
benefits outweighed the costs, individuals would commit dishonest acts. However, years later 
Becker (1993) found that there are anomalies in this process and that these are not analyzed in 
a purely rational way. Ariely (2012) argues that dishonesty is influenced by self-justifications 
and by our own self-concepts and recent studies (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013; Ariely, 2012; 
Utikal & Fischbacher, 2013) states that moral reminders would be able to inhibit dishonesty 
on individuals. In this context, this research sought to verify if control mechanisms, such as 
auditing and reading the professional code of professional accountant, would be able to inhibit 
dishonesty. For this, an experiment was applied with 204 students in which they were to make 
group decisions and, in the second stage of the experiment, participants were exposed to 
possible inhibitory mechanisms: half of them were informed that they would undergo an audit 
process, and the other half should read articles in the code of ethics and then make group 
decisions. The results showed that the mechanisms presented reduced dishonesty to 9% of the 
participants, as opposed to the initial 27% of dishonesty, without the mechanisms, 
demonstrating that enforcement mechanisms and moral reminders are able to reduce 




The study of dishonesty has two main paths: the first, based on traditional economic 
theory and the studies of Becker (1968), is based on the idea that individuals are rational and 
dishonest acts are committed on the basis of a relation of cost-benefit analysis, supported by 
the following threefold: the benefits received from the action, the possibility of being 
discovered and the applicable punishment. However, while believing that individuals are 
rational, Becker (1993) himself, years later, argued that ethical factors could influence this 
process. 
Thus, the second path, based mainly on the research of Ariely (2012), emphasizes that 
dishonest behavior is also influenced by self-justifications, that is, concepts that we make of 
our own honesty that cannot be overcome. Even if the dishonest act satisfy the rational 
precepts of committing it (high benefits, little risk of being discovered and weak punishment), 
the individual may not be totally dishonest, as not to hurt the honest self-image of himself. 
These two theories are the basis for the study of dishonest behavior, and several 
researches have been developed to understand the motives that lead individuals to be 
dishonest (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; 
Santos, 2011; Castillo et al., 2014; Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, Avelino & Cunha, 2017; 
Tomazelli, 2011). Nowadays a series of corruption scandals involving large companies such 
as Enron, WorldCom, and even Brazilian companies such as Petrobras, Furnas, Eletronuclear 
and several companies in the civil construction industry are evident. These events reinforce 
the idea that dishonest attitudes in the corporate world are hardly committed by an individual 
alone, but by a group of people, and in some cases the top echelon of the company. 
To understand the motivators of dishonest group behavior, some international 
researches have been developed (Charness & Sutter, 2012; Kugler et al., 2007; Sutter, 2009; 
Bénabou, 2012; Bénabou & Tirole, 2006; Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 2017; Conrads et al., 
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2013; Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi, 2013), but none involving possible mechanisms that 
inhibit dishonesty. 
In order to verify if the insertion of moral reminders would be able to minimize the 
dishonest behavior of the individuals, the researches reached the same conclusion: the honesty 
of the individuals tends to appear before moral reminders (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013; 
Ariely, 2012; Utikal & Fischbacher, 2013; Aveyard, 2014; Keizer, Lindenberg & Steg, 
2008; Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Mullen & Nadler, 2008). Thereby, when conducting group 
discussions, they may cheat less when facing moral reminders. 
With the recent corruption scandals involving companies and based on the theory 
that moral reminders tend to reduce dishonest behavior, the following research problem 
arose: Control mechanisms are capable of influencing the dishonest behavior of 
individuals and groups? 
Thus, the purpose of this study is to present how the insertion of control mechanisms, 
such as auditing and professional ethical norms, would influence the dishonest behavior of 
individuals in particular, and in a group. To achieve the objective of the research, an 
experiment based on the data set developed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and 
Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2017) was used. 
In the following section the theoretical foundation that will approach concepts about 
professional ethics and previous researches that used control mechanisms as a means to 
inhibit dishonesty will be presented; below, the methods used are shown are for the 
development of research, with the description of the experiment applied to the sample and its 
stages; then the results found in the research are included; and, finally, the final 
considerations. 
  
4.2 Literature Review 
  
The concept of morality can be understood as values (good or bad, allowed or 
forbidden) and the correct conduct valid for the members of a society (Chauí, 2002). Every 
culture and every society has its own morality and there may even be several morals in the 
same society. 
Ethics, therefore, is the "science of human conduct before the being and its fellows" 
(Sá, 2001, p. 15), within which studies are developed on what is approved or disapproved in 
the field of virtuous actions. However, ethics and morals are not synonymous: ethics is what 
should or should not be lived, what is correct, while morality is the set of norms and rules 
established in a given society, and may vary according to the local culture (Tomazelli, 2011). 
Since ethics is of vital importance for the behavior of man in society, then the need to 
transfer this concept to the reality of business arises, in which professional ethics can be 
understood as the application of ethics concepts in professional activities (Camargo, 2008). 
In the beginning, for Aristotle, the economic was seen as a branch of ethics, which 
should include all other sciences, for the purpose of the man's well-being (Sen, 1999). At that 
time, economics was seen as the art of managing the family. However, especially through the 
consolidation of the capitalist market model, self-interest has been an important feature in 
economic theory and is therefore considered a rational thought, thus shifting from the ethics 
and economics, causing a number of shortcomings (Sen, 1999).   
Adam Smith (1983), known as the father of modern economics, defended the idea of 
self-interest. In other words, one must be concerned only with their own interests and that the 
market is responsible for bringing mutual gains to trade, the wealth of a nation resulted from 
the action of individuals moved by their own interest. However, Smith was also concerned 
with the use of ethical principles in business (Sen, 1993; Sen, 1999). 
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Following the thought of Smith, ethics was moving away from the economy 
(whichever the idea of self-interest), thus resulting in the criterion called "Pareto Optimality", 
which consists in finding solutions for certain situations, in which at least one of the agents 
will be better off without degrading the situation of other agents. That is, at least one of the 
agents is in a better situation than before (more useful), without reducing the usefulness of the 
others (no one is harmed). In this way, the "Pareto Optimality" is not necessarily a beneficial 
solution, from the social point of view (Sen, 1993).  Therefore, the modern economy was 
based on the idea of self-interest and the “Pareto Optimality”. 
It is possible to affirm, therefore, that a self-interested behavior can possess ethical 
problems, emphasizing the freedom of choice of the individual. With the intention of 
mitigating this problem, the teaching of ethics as a reflection in the organizational 
environment arose in the 1960s in schools in the United States. In this way, the creation of 
Professional Codes of Ethics was developed, with the main objective of being the formation 
of the professional awareness of its members about behavior patterns (Tomazelli, 2011). 
Each profession has its own specific Code of Ethics, which varies according to its 
norms and rules and it presents the ideal conduct that each professional should have in the 
exercise of his profession. The Code of Ethics should support decisions taken in an 
organizational setting, also aware that every individual should have their own  ethical 
concepts. 
The studies by Mazar and Ariely (2006), Mazar, Amir and Ariely (2008) and Ariely 
(2012) found that individuals have a self-image about their honesty, and they are capable of 
committing dishonest attitudes, since they do not go beyond the threshold of this ethical self-
concept, to the point of feeling like a criminal. 
In order to check the influence of the control mechanisms over dishonest behavior, 
national and international studies about the solution of this problem were 
developed: Utikal and Fischbacher (2013) conducted an experiment among university 
students and nuns and found that religious presented a less greedy behavior; on the other 
hand, Abeler, Becker and Falk (2014) and Ruffle and Tobol (2014) showed that religion has 
no influence on honesty; Pruckner and Sausgruber (2013) and Ariely (2012) showed that 
when faced with moral reminders, such as recite the 10 commandments or put the hand on the 
Bible, individuals presents less dishonest behavior. 
 In Brazil, Santos (2011) found in the experiment that a moral reminder  concerning 
religion does not significantly affect dishonesty; Melo Segundo (2016) found that individuals 
who attend more regularly religious ceremonies are less dishonest; Ganassin (2016) found no 
relation between the anchors tested and the level of dishonesty of the individuals. 
Regarding gender, several papers did not present evidence of their influence on 
dishonesty (Abeler, Becker & Falk, 2014; Gravert, 2013; Franzen & Pointner, 2013; 
Lundquist et al., 2009; Erat & Gneezy, 2012). Azar, Yosef, and Bar-Eli (2013) have shown 
that women are more likely to tell the truth, but they would also have greater ability to make 
excuses. 
The number of people involved in a task can influence dishonesty too: Charness and 
Sutter (2012) and Kugler et al. (2007) argue that the same people who are honest individually 
can make dishonest decisions in a group; Sutter (2009) showed that individuals are more 
dishonest in groups than individually; Conrads et al. (2013) state that in a group task, it is 
more difficult to detect the person responsible for the fraud and dishonest acts tend to be more 
recurrent. 
However, Bénabou (2012) and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) identified that there may be 
a downward dishonest tendency when individuals are inserted in a group as a result of social 
concerns with their image. In addition, as a group, individuals may have a better 
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understanding of standards, thus reducing dishonest behavior (Kocher, Schudy & Spantig, 
2017). 
As there is evidence that moral reminders are capable of influencing individuals' 
dishonest behavior (Pruckner & Saussarrier, 2013; Ariely, 2012; Abeler, Becker & Falk, 
2014; Santos, 2011), it is necessary to study this influence in the collective behavior. 
Thus, it is possible to verify that right or wrong depends on each individual and the 
situation in which one is inserted: the same person can present a morally accepted behavior in 
one scenario, and present a dishonest behavior in another. Therefore, it is necessary to 
understand which mechanisms influence dishonesty and the ones that diminish it, especially 
when it comes to a group of people. Based on this premise, the following research hypothesis 
arises: 
  
H3: When controls mechanisms (audit) and moral reminders (rules of the Professional Code 
of Ethics of the Accountant) are inserted, individuals are less dishonest in collective decision-
making. 
  
4.3 Experimental Design 
  
To achieve the purpose of this research, possible dishonesty inhibitors  were inserted 
in the experiment, in order to observe if the posture of the participants changed, with respect 
to honesty, when  subjected to a process of control and monitoring of their activities. For this, 
an experiment will be carried out, based on the die-rolling game of Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013) and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2016), which was divided into two stages. 
The experiment consists in: the player should watch a video on the computer with a 
die-rolling game, whose numbers range from 1 to 6; in this stage of the experiment, all 
participants saw the same number 1 (one). Then each participant should report the number 
displayed on the dice, however, their compensation is linked to the number informed, thus 
enabling dishonesty. Each number reported by the participant equals one point, which is 
equivalent to BRL 1.00 (one real). The sum of the points was done by the computer itself, at 
the end of the experiment, where the participant receives the amount of his remuneration. 
In the first stage of the experiment, the participants were divided into two groups, 
randomly formed by the system, called GroupPC and GroupNoPC. The difference between 
each group consists of the rules for playing and the remuneration system: the participants 
inserted in the GroupPC must inform the same number to receive the remuneration; if at least 
one participant in the group reports a different number, everyone in the group earn 0 (zero) 
points. For this, the system chose at random three members to participate in the group and 
before informing the number of the dice, the members would chat for two minutes in a virtual 
chat room. 
With respect to the GroupNoPC, three members will be selected randomly by the 
system too, but the difference lies in the form of payment: the members also discuss for two 
minutes in the chat, however, each one receive the compensation according to the value 
reported; there was no need for participants to report the same value. 
The second part of the experiment is similar to the first one, though, at this moment, 
possible mechanisms that inhibit dishonesty are inserted: the possibility of some group going 
through an audit process or reading some articles of the Professional Code of Ethics of the 
Accountant (PCEA). 
Thus, in the second part of the experiment, after visualization of a new video with the 
die-rolling (in this stage the video presented the number two) and before informing the 
number, the participants were warned that, at random, a group would be chosen to go through 
an audit of the given response – which would be performed on the computer itself. In case the 
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group that went through the audit had informed a value different from the one observed in the 
dice, the participant (for the treatment GroupNoPC) or the whole group (for the GroupPC) 
received 0 (zero) points. Possibly because they are subject to investigation of the reported 
information, the individuals might feel inhibited to commit dishonest acts, especially because 
they will not receive the reward. 
Another portion of the participants was tested whether the inclusion of articles of 
PCEA by CFC (Federal Accounting Council in Brazil), Resolution n. 803/1996, which deals 
with the Professional Code of Ethics of the Accountant, decreased dishonesty. The members 
were divided into groups GroupPC and GroupNoPC, shortly after the release of the dice and 
before the conversation in the chat with the other members of the group,, items from PCEA 
appears on the screen (specifically, articles 2, 3, 9 and 12), which deal about the ethical 
behavior of professionals and the sanctions that they may suffer if they do not comply with 
the norms. Immediately after reading it, participants should correctly answer a multiple-
choice question about articles read in order to check whether the reading was actually done so 
they could move on to the next phase (there was a set of 3 random questions in order to 
impede the participants from communicating with each other and  know the answer). 
The purpose of this part in the experiment is to verify whether, when reminded of their 
moral standards, participants are less dishonest than when there are no such reminders. 
According to Santos (2011), if a reminder of moral standards has any effect on honesty, it can 
be said that people do not automatically remember these standards when taking their 
decisions. Table 12 support on the understanding of the experiment: 
 
Table 12: Design of the third experiment 
Treatments 
Part 1 
Part 2  
(half of the participants with the audit and 
the other half with PCEA articles) 
GroupPC GroupPC 
GroupNoPC GroupNoPC 
Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
Throughout the experiment, communication between participants was not allowed, 
only during chats. Before each stage of the experiment, they were given instructions on how 
to proceed and participants answered questions in order to show that they understood what 
was being asked: only after answering the question correctly, they would proceed to the next 
stage. 
Before the start of the experiment, it was requested that each participant answer a 
questionnaire with questions about gender, level of education and family income, in order to 
obtain an overview of the respondents. At the end, appears on the computer the number of 
points earned and the sum in reais (R$), the value to be pocketed. Thus, each participant filled 
the paper on the desk with this information, delivered to the applicator and received the 
amount in cash. 
Table 13 presented the steps of the experiment: 
 
 Table 13: Stages of the third experiment 
PHASES DESCRIPTION 
General Instructions 
Instructions are given to participants about how to proceed in the 
experiment, such as pay, anonymity and chat interaction. 
Questionnaire 
The participants answer a questionnaire with personal 
information, such as age, study institution, family income. 
PART 1 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
The system automatically and randomly divides the participants 
into the two groups (GroupPC and GroupNoPC) and sends 
instructions on the next step to each participant, taking into 
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account the type of group to which it is inserted. Participants 
should also inform if they understood the task to be performed. 
Die-Rolling 
Participants watch (individually) a video with the die-rolling. In 
this stage, the video was the same for all the participants 
presenting the number 1 (one). 
Instructions for group interaction 
Participants received instructions about how the chat will work, 
such as the time they would have to talk and the prohibition of 
identifying themselves. 
Group interaction 
Participants interact in a virtual chat, without the possibility of 
identifying the other members of the group. 
Decision Making 
The participants individually report the result of the data entry, 
considering that the remuneration is tied to the number they 
inform and the group in which it is inserted. 
PART 2 OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Instructions 
Participants remain divided into the same group in which they 
responded to part 1 of the experiment, receive instructions on how 
to proceed to the next stage and answer if they understood the 
task. 
Audit Report 
Half of the groups will be informed that they will be subject to an 
audit process: the system will randomly choose a participant to be 
audited. In case the group that suffer the audit had informed a 
value different from the one observed in the data entry, the 
participant (for the treatment GroupNoPC) or the whole group 
(for the GroupPC treatment) would earn 0 (zero) points. 
PCEA Articles 
The other half of the group should read articles from the 
Professional Code of Ethics of the Accountant (CFC Resolution n. 
803/1996). After the reading, the participants would answer a 
question in order to confirm that they had read the text. 
Die-Rolling 
Participants watch (individually) a video with the die-
rolling. Members of the same group watch the same video. Also 
in this stage, the video is the same for all participants, presenting 
the number 2 (two). 
Instructions for group interaction 
Participants received instructions about how the chat will work, 
such as the time they would have to talk and the prohibition of 
identifying themselves. 
Group interaction 
Participants interact in a virtual chat, without the possibility of 
identifying the other members of the group. 
Decision making. 
The participants individually report the result of the data entry, 
considering that the remuneration is tied to the number they 
inform and the group in which it is inserted. 
FINAL PART 
Payment 
The participant is informed of the sum of points and the reais he 
received at the end of the experiment. The participant put these 
amounts on paper and delivers them to the Applicator to receive 
their remuneration. 
Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
The sessions of the experiment were carried out in the two laboratories of the Federal 
University of Rio Grande do Norte, which is located in the state of the same name, due to the 




, 2018, with students from the 
Accounting course.  
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The data were collected in 13 rounds, with an approximate duration of 20 minutes 
(each participant took, on average, 14 minutes to complete the experiment), with 204 
participants in total. The income spent was BRL 880.00, an average of BRL 4.31 for each 
participant: if all the participants had been honest in their answers, the cost of the experiment 
would be BRL 612.00, that is, there was an expense of BRL 268.00 more due to dishonesty. 
The experiment was created especially for this research and conducted through the 
link http://experiment-parte3.firebaseapp.com. Afterwards, the conversations were also 
analyzed by the participants through the chat, some fragments of the dialogues were extracted 
and elaborated as wordclouds, through the site, www.wordclouds.com. The purpose of 
creating the wordclouds was to verify the expressions most used by the respondents. 
In order to test whether individuals are less dishonest when inserting inhibitory 
mechanisms, the McNemar test was carried out in order to ascertain whether the frequency of 
dishonesty observed in the first stage and the second stage are equal or not. The statistical 
software SPSS
®




During the execution of the experiment, the system presented the same number  for all 
participants: in the first stage, the data showed the number 1 (one), and in the second, the 
number 2 (two). It means that, to be characterized as "honest", at the end of the experiment 
the participant should receive the amount of BRL 3.00 (three reais). The amount spent, if 
everybody were honest, would be BRL 612.00. However, the total expense in the experiment 
was BRL 880.00, BRL 268.00 more. 
About 56% of the participants defined themselves as men and 44% women. In order to 
balance out the relation to the type of group and to the possible mechanism to inhibit 
dishonesty, the system was programmed as follows: 
 
Table 14: Example of group division and mechanism inhibitor in the third experiment 
Group Group Type Inhibitory Mechanism 
1 GroupNoPC Code of Ethics 
2 GroupPC Code of Ethics 
3 GroupNoPC Audit 
4 GroupPC Audit 
   Source: prepared by the authors. 
  
Sequentially and randomly, the type of group and the inhibitory mechanism were 
chosen by the system so that there was no imbalance of the participants. At the end, 53% of 
the respondents were allocated to the GroupNoPC, 39% of which were in the Audit and 61% 
in the Code of Ethics. The remaining 47% who remained in the GroupPC, 41% were 
informed of the Audit and 59% read the PCEA articles. In general, 40% of the participants 
participated in the inhibitory mechanism of Audit and 60% of the Code of Ethics. 
Despite the extra amount expended due to the dishonesty, the largest share of people 
who collaborated with the experiment were honest: 70% (142 people) reported that the sum of 
the data, in two stages, was 3, compared to 30% (62 people) who mentioned a higher value. 
In order to investigate whether the use of control mechanisms, such as audit, and 
moral reminders, such as the PCEA articles, would have some effect on the decision-making 
regarding the honesty of the participants, a separate analysis is necessary between the parts of 
the experiment. In the first part, in which respondents only had to play in groups, divided into 
their respective groups, 73% were honest. When the possible inhibitory mechanisms are 
inserted, the percentage of honest ones goes from 73% to 91%, and the dishonest ones, from 
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27% in the first part, to 9% with the inhibitors. This result corroborates the findings of 
previous research (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013; Ariely, 2012; Abeler, Becker & Falk, 2014; 
Santos, 2011) which bring evidence that moral reminders are capable of influencing the 
dishonest behavior of individuals. Table 15 shows the responses in each part of the 
experiment: 
 
       Table 15: Matrix of responses – third experiment 
 Honest – part 2 Dishonest – part 2 
Honest – part 1 142 6 
Dishonest – part 1 43 13 
         Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
With the inclusion of possible inhibitory mechanisms (code of ethics and auditing), it 
was possible to verify a decrease in dishonesty of approximately 18%. To verify if this 
decrease is indeed significant, the non-parametric McNemar test was performed and the 
results can be seen in Table 16: 
 
                                Table 16: McNemar statistics – third experiment 
Frequency Without inhibitor With inhibitor 
Honest 72,5% 90,7% 
Dishonest 27,5% 9,3% 
Chi-Square 26,449  
McNemar test 0,000  
N of valid cases 204  
   Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
Presenting a value of 0.000, the McNemar test rejected the null hypothesis and showed 
that there are differences between the percentages found, that is, when individuals were 
subjected to an audit process or read the articles of the PCEA, they were more honest in their 
decisions. 
The McNemar test was also applied to the sample, in the categories gender, income 
and group type, PC or NoPC and the data are described in Table 17: 
 
           Table 17: McNemar statistics by category (gender) – third experiment 
Frequency 
Men Women 
Audit PCEA Audit PCEA 
Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 
Honest 69,4 91,8 75,8 89,4 71,9 93,8 71,9 89,5 
Dishonest 30,6 8,2 24,2 10,6 28,1 6,3 28,1 10,5 
McNemar  0,003  0,035  0,039  0,006 
N  49  66  32  57 
Cochran’Q  0,002  0,020  0,020  0,004 
            Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
           Table 18: McNemar statistics by category (income) – third experiment 
Frequency 
Income ≤ 5,000 Income > 5,000 
Audit PCEA Audit PCEA 
Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 
Honest 77,6 93,9 70,7 90,2 59,4 90,6 80,5 87,8 
Dishonest 22,4 6,1 29,3 9,8 40,6 9,4 19,5 12,2 
McNemar  0,039  0,000  0,002  0,453 
N  49  82  32  41 
Cochran’Q  0,021  0,000  0,002  0,257 
            Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
           Table 19: McNemar statistics by category (type of group) – third experiment 
Frequency 
GroupPC GroupNoPC 
Audit PCEA Audit PCEA 
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Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 Part1 Part2 
Honest 61,5 92,3 57,9 86,0 78,6 92,9 87,9 92,4 
Dishonest 38,5 7,7 42,1 14,0 21,4 7,1 12,1 7,6 
McNemar  0,000  0,000  0,109  0,549 
N  39  57  42  66 
Cochran’Q  0,001  0,000  0,058  0,366 
            Source: prepared by the authors. 
 
In all classifications there was an increase in honesty (hence a decrease in dishonesty) 
when the inhibitory mechanisms were inserted. The McNemar test shows that this increase in 
honesty is statistically significant, except for the   individuals who receive more than 5,000 
and who received the moral reminders and participants who were in GroupNoPC, in which 
the statistic was not relevant.  
In addition, of the 60 people who were dishonest in the experiment as a whole (30% of 
the participants), 30 of them displayed maximum dishonesty in the first part of the experiment 
(number 6) and were honest in the second part (reporting 2) with the inhibitors. 
The greatest increase in honesty between the first and the second stage of the 
experiment was perceived in the participants of the GroupPC: an increase of 6% for those 
who would be subject to an Audit and 8% for those who read the PCEA articles; a total 
increase of 14% in honesty. Since the members of GroupPC should inform the same number 
so that they would receive the remuneration, if at least one person reported a different 
number, everyone would earn 0 (zero). In GroupNoPC, there was an increase of 3% of honest 
who were notified about the Audit and 1% about the Code of Ethics. 
Some reactions of the participants are important to be reported: a) 5 people did not 
accept receiving the money; 2 had been honest, 2 had placed 7 and 1 had placed 12; b) a girl 
who did not win anything, as a result of divergence in the group (she was in GroupPC) was 
extremely irritated and slammed the door of the laboratory; c) 4 people asked whose 
experiment money was it; after receiving the explanation that the money was from the 
Applicator,  everyone took the money; d) a boy questioned the Applicator on a question 
regarding the experimental procedure and, after that, waited the Applicator to leave and  put 
the number 6; e) a student had already left but ended up returning to inform that he rejoiced 
the payment day of the group, because now they would have money to buy a snack; f) one 
participant donated BRL 2.00 to another participant so that the Applicator would not remain 
without change; g) many people were interested in reading the research; h) some people went 
to the Applicator to find out what the experiment was; the main suspicions were about 
dishonesty; verify the errors that audit firms make; analyze whether in the absence of the 
audit, companies profit more; induce participants to make mistakes. 
Through the extraction of the conversations in the chat, it was possible to elaborate 
wordclouds, separately, in the Groups PC and NoPC: 
  


















 Through the wordclouds and analysis of the conversations carried out in the virtual 
environment, it was possible to perceive that there was not much distinction in relation to the 
groups, since the majority of the participants agreed among themselves the number that they 
should put, even if they were inserted in the GroupNoPC, in which the group members could 
report divergent numbers since their compensation would be based on the reported number. 
As can be seen in the extract of some dialogues, with the inhibitor mechanisms present 
in the experiment, participants were conflicted as to the number that they should inform and 
also made them display a more honest behavior: a) "–Because the higher the number, the 
more you earn"; "–but you are acting in bad faith, the idea is not to make money"; "–but the 
problem is if it's something ethical"; b) "–Is it a dishonesty test?"; "–It was 1 for everyone, but 
we can bypass the rules saying it was 6 "; "–Let's put 6, you can buy juice and a snack"; "–lol, 
corruption"; c) "The question is to be honest or to make money"; d) "–The idea here is not to 
make money but to leave with a clean conscience"; "–I just understood now, I thought the 
game was about management, I was not expecting to act clean or dirty, I thought it was 
something about administration"; e) "Now you have the audit, right?!"; f) "–After that 
resolution there, I did not lie"; "–that little text gave us a reprimand"; "–a text is effective"; g) 
"–the debate is about being honest or profitable"; "–I believe they want to test ethics"; "–they 
put everything to weigh the conscience and to do the right thing"; h) "–Our profession is 
governed by ethics, will I put 1 or 6 for money?"; i) "–Should we put the credible 
information?  Combine a false value? What should we do? We have to put the same thing to 
the Federal Police and the Revenue Service to think that we are all right"; "–Will everybody 
put 6 and win BRL 6.00? Or let's be honest"; j) "–With audit or without audit ... money 
matters little, what you do is to type what you saw"; "–Honesty above all else"; "–since this is 
missing in Brazil"; k) "I put the truth in the first and also it in the second , because this time it 
will be audited"; l) "After seeing the code of ethics, the weight is greater". 
Below, a summary of the experiment: 
a) Number of participants – 204; 
b) Number of dishonest people – 62 (30%); 
c) Average total amount received – BRL 4.31; 
d) Average time taken to complete the experiment – 13 minutes and 48 seconds; 
e) Average attempt to understand the experiment – 3; 
f) Average age of participants – 24 years; 
g) Total amount spent – BRL 880.00; 




This research about dishonesty has as one of its bases the work of Ariely (2012),  and 
states that the dishonest behavior of individuals is influenced by self-justifications, that is, 
individuals have pre-formulated concepts about their self-image and honesty. Therefore, all 
people are capable of committing dishonest acts as long as those acts do not exceed the limit 
of their ethical self-concept. 
Aware of this theory, several studies have intended to verify the existence of possible 
control mechanisms that would be able to inhibit or decrease the dishonesty of individuals 
(Utikal & Fischbacher, 2013; Abeler, Becker & Falk, 2014; Ruffle & Tobol, 2014; Pruckner 
& Sausgruber, 2013; Ariely, 2012; Santos, 2011; Ganassin, 2016) such as religion or moral 
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reminders. Thus, this research also verified if certain mechanisms would be able to influence 
the decision making concerning dishonesty when these individuals are inserted in groups and 
not individually. 
Regardless, the majority of the participants were honest (70% of the people) and the 
findings of the experiment corroborated not only the research hypothesis but also the previous 
studies, since it was possible to verify that the audit and the reading of some articles of the 
Professional Code of Ethics of the Accountant made the participants less dishonest: in the first 
part of the experiment, when the individuals were not subject to any control mechanism, 27% 
of the participants were dishonest; in the second part, when they would be subject to an audit 
process or after reading the PCEA articles, the percentage of dishonest ones went down to 
9%. 
In view of the results found, one of the possibilities for decreasing dishonesty when 
deciding on the preparation of financial statements would be to increase the scope of 
companies required to have their reports audited by independent auditors and, if found to be 
dishonest, even before publication, that they could suffer some kind of punishment, as 
proposed in the experiment. Anyhow, independent auditing firms that audited companies 
discovered in fraudulent schemes also faced more effective punishments by regulators. 
Regarding moral reminders, the creation or expansion of continuing education 
movements by regulators, especially on ethics, can help to reduce dishonesty. The time 
component has not been addressed in this research, ie how long the individual is able to recall 
moral reminders, so perhaps the individual's obligation to sign a statement attesting to the 
truth of the data may be an element of dishonesty, as proposed in Ariely (2012). The use of 
accounting standards based on principles rather than rules increases the discretion of 
accounting preparers, which may lead to an increase in dishonest attitudes, although in 
researches such as those of Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) and JeanJean and Stolowy 
(2008) has been shown to decrease manipulation techniques, such as earnings management. 
With this, educational investment in ethics becomes urgent even though this entails monetary 
expenditures. 
Although the data from this research demonstrate that auditing and reading the Code 
of Ethics have decrease the dishonesty of individuals, this does not mean that there are no 
other mechanisms that can influence, even more effectively, the inhibition of dishonesty. The 
mechanisms chosen here were an initial work proposal in order to understand their impacts on 
the dishonesty of individuals, when they should make decisions collectively. Future research 
may broaden the scope of work, introducing other mechanisms that inhibit dishonesty or 






In the face of several recent corruption scandals, not only in Brazil but also 
internationally, involving companies, politicians, auditing and accounting firms, several 
studies have set out to study the determinants of dishonesty in individuals (Mazar, Amir & 
Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006; Gino, Ayal & Ariely, 2013; Santos, 2011; Castillo et al., 
2009; Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, Avelino & Cunha, 2017; Tomazelli, 2011). 
The theory developed by Ariely (2012) states that dishonest decisions are not made 
after a cost-benefit analysis of the situation but that, especially, internal motivations influence 
this behavior. Named Maneuver Margin Theory, it certifies that individuals seek the 
maximum possible benefits from cheating at all times, but also pay close attention not to hurt 
their ethical self-concepts, so that it does not modify their honest image of themselves. 
In this same theory, this research analyzed different aspects of the dishonest behavior 
of individuals, but, unlike previous researches (Glätzer-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015; Ariely, 
2012; Gneezy, 2005; Gneezy, Rockenbach & Serra-Garcia, 2013; Melo Segundo, 2016; Lima, 
Avelino & Cunha, 2017; Santos, 2011; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Mazar & Ariely, 2006), 
that analyzed this behavior at the individual level, the present research  investigated 
dishonesty when the decision-making  was performed in a group, thus resembling decision 
making in corporate environments. 
For this, three different studies were carried out with the same methodology, focusing 
on the investigation of dishonest behavior: computer experiments, based on the works of 
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) and Kocher, Schudy and Spantig (2016). The 
experiments were performed with 634 participants in total (250 in the first, 180 in the second 
and 204 in the third). In all experiments, players should watch a die-rolling game and then 
report which number they saw in the dice, and their pay was tied to the number they reported 
and not to the number they actually saw, giving way to dishonesty. 
The first experiment was to find, as initial focus, the effect that a social group would 
inflict upon individual dishonesty. Thus, the experiment was performed in two stages: in the 
first, the participants played alone, and in the second stage they were to decide in a group (of 
three people), which was formed by the system, randomly. Although the participants were 
generally more honest (55%), it was verified that the individuals were more dishonest when 
the decision making was done in a group (36%) than when individually (23%). 
The second experiment aimed to analyze whether the existence of an individual in a 
superior situation (such as a boss or senior executive) influence in dishonest behavior, 
possibly causing the group to make less honest decisions. The same type of experiment was 
conducted, however with a different sample, and in the first stage the participants were to 
make group decisions and, in the second stage, the same group formation was maintained, but 
one of the members was randomly chosen by the system as the leader. At this stage, the leader 
received double the pay and could influence others to be dishonest in order to profit more. 
Different from the first experiment, the majority of the participants were dishonest 
(56%). In the first stage, 36% of the participants were found to be dishonest, while in the 
second, 44%. This corroborates the hypothesis of the research that the leader has influence 
over the others so that they are more dishonest. 
The third and final experiment had the purpose of investigating whether the insertion 
of possible control mechanisms would be able to decrease or inhibit dishonesty. In the first 
part of the experiment the participants would normally play in a group and, after the decision 
of the second party, they would either be informed that there would be an audit in the system 
or should read articles of the Professional Code of Ethics of the Accountant. Based on 
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previous studies (Pruckner & Sausgruber, 2013; Ariely, 2012; Abeler; Becker & Falk, 2014; 
Santos, 2011) that moral reminders can reduce some control mechanism (91%) when they 
played without the mechanisms (73%). 
As the participants' remuneration was made in Brazilian currency, there was a 
financial expense caused by dishonesty in the amount of BRL 1,445.00 (BRL 562.00 in the 
first experiment, BRL 615.00 in the second, and BRL 268.00 in the third). 
The three experiments, although different, deal with the same theme and reveal aspects 
about the dishonest behavior of individuals, when they are about to make decisions in a 
group: in the samples surveyed, individuals were more dishonest when they decided in groups 
than individually, which is in line with the findings of previous research (e.g. Kocher, Schudy 
& Spantig, 2017; Conrads et al., 2013; Fischbacher, Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Chitilová and 
Korbel, 2014). Since, in general, decisions in corporate environments are made by a board, 
and individuals has the tendency to be more dishonest when making decisions in a group, it is 
necessary to deepen these studies, seeking to identify the reasons why this phenomenon 
occurs, being it by the possibility of covering up dishonest acts, either to benefit other 
members of the group or even by the fact that the threshold of dishonesty of the individual 
increases when he observes the threshold of other individuals. 
It was also identified in this research that the figure of a leader, who received double 
remuneration, made the other members of the group more dishonest. Although this leader did 
not exactly have the figure of an executive leader in the companies (he was not named by his 
competencies but randomly by the system, there was the possibility that the other members of 
the group did not know who the leader was), it was possible to perceive that the form of their 
remuneration influences the dishonesty of the members of the group. Future research can not 
only improve the leader's figure and bring it closer to reality, but also check for ways of 
remuneration which are capable of diminishing dishonesty. 
In the face of increased dishonesty when individuals are inserted into a group, it 
becomes necessary to investigate mechanisms that decrease dishonesty. The data of this 
research verified that in communicating that the data can be audited, individuals tend to be 
more honest, possibly as a result of the supervision: when the individual has his answers 
checked by others, and can still suffer some kind of sanction if the dishonest act is discovered, 
he tends to be more honest in his decision-making. 
Another mechanism also tested in this research was the moral reminders, here 
characterized by the articles of the PCEA: as also evidenced in previous research (Pruckner & 
Sausgruber, 2013; Ariely, 2012), moral reminders tend to decrease individuals' dishonesty. 
These moral reminders are not present in everyday life but a possible solution would be to 
intensify continuing education courses, already promoted by the class councils, on 
professional ethics. In addition, it is also necessary to study other mechanisms that can reduce 
dishonesty and seek a way to insert them into decision-making. 
Analyzing the data collected in the three experiments in a compiled way, disregarding 
the question of whether they were performed at different locations and at different times, it is 
possible to perceive an increase in dishonesty: in the first stage of the first experiment, 
participants played alone, 23% of the individuals were dishonest. Still in the same experiment, 
when placed in groups, this percentage rises to 36%. Compared with the second experiment, 
in the first stage, which is similar to the second stage of the first experiment, 36% of the 
participants were dishonest: when the figure of the leader is inserted, this percentage rises to 
44%. When the third experiment is carried out, in which are inserted possible mechanisms 
that inhibit dishonesty, dishonest people constitute only 9% of the participants. Aware of the 
differences in each experiment, but based on Ariely (2012), who analyzed dishonest behavior 
in several different countries and verified that there is no difference in the level of dishonesty 
among them, it is possible to perceive an increase in dishonesty when individuals make 
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decisions individually, in group and with the figure of a leader; in addition, the presence of 
the audit and the memory of ethical codes, made the individuals analyzed present a less 
dishonest behavior. 
Thereby, this work reinforces the importance of the study of dishonesty, not only 
because of its ethical and moral impacts on society, but also because of its financial impact. In 
addition, it also emphasizes the relevance of a work that explores dishonesty in a group, 
which has not yet been studied, but is very present in the daily life of companies. 
It is also important to emphasize that this study has several limitations and it does not 
propose to exhaust the issue of dishonesty. Moreover, internal considerations of each 
individual were not evaluated in making their choices because they understood that this 
subject is in the scope of other sciences, such as Psychology and Sociology, but only to 
present the existence of dishonesty in a simple game  in which financial remuneration was 
involved and also to present some mechanisms that can reduce  dishonesty, present in daily 
accounting. 
Suggestions for future research can be described as: testing other possible dishonest 
inhibitor mechanisms; adjust the characteristics of the leader, making it closer to that found in 
companies; the experiments can be performed in companies in order to verify if the same 
results will be found in professionals who already work in the job market; or to add punitive 
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APPENDIX – Experiments Information’s 
 
Appendix includes information about the experiments (in Portuguese). Initially, participants 
received instructions for the experiment on the computer screen 
 
INSTRUÇÕES GERAIS: 
Bem-vindo a esse experimento e obrigado por participar! 
Por favor, a partir de agora, NÃO FALE com nenhum outro participante! 
 
Procedimentos Gerais: 
Nesse experimento, estamos estudando tomadas de decisões econômicas. Você pode ganhar 
dinheiro participando. O que você irá ganhar será pago ao final do experimento, de forma 
individual e privada, e em dinheiro. O experimento consiste em duas partes no qual você deve 
tomar decisões independentes. No começo de cada etapa, você receberá instruções detalhadas 
de como proceder. Se você tiver qualquer dúvida durante o experimento, por favor, levante a 
sua mão. Um instrutor irá até você e responderá a sua dúvida, em particular. 
 
Durante o experimento, você e os outros participantes terão que tomar decisões e, 
possivelmente, você terá que interagir (através do chat) com outros participantes também. O 
seu pagamento será determinado por suas decisões e pelas decisões dos outros participantes.  
 
Pagamento: 
Em algumas partes do experimento, não será mencionado sobre “Reais”, mas sim sobre 
“pontos”. Seus ganhos serão calculados em pontos. No final do experimento, os pontos serão 
convertidos em Reais, com uma taxa de conversão de: 
 
1 ponto = 1 Real 
 
O seu pagamento acontecerá no final do experimento. Cada participante será chamado pelo 
seu código de identificação, para pagamentos individuais. Nenhum outro participante saberá 




A análise do experimento será feita anonimamente. NÃO SERÁ REALIZADO NENHUM 
LINK ENTRE O SEU NOME E OS DADOS GERADOS NO EXPERIMENTO! Você 
não saberá a identidade de nenhum participante, nem antes nem após o término do 
experimento. Também os outros participantes não saberão a sua identidade. Durante todo o 
experimento, sua única forma de identificação será através do código de identificação que 
você receberá no início do experimento. Ao teclar em “OK”, você está concordando em 
participar do experimento:  



















Instructions for Part 2: GroupNoPC 
[for GroupPC, instructions were identical except for part called “Attention”. In GroupPC, the 
text was: “ATTENTION: You must enter the same number as the other participants in your 
group. All members of the group must report the same number: if at least one participant 
reports a different number, all members of the group will receive 0 (zero) points. Before 
informing the number, you will have the possibility to interact with the other members of the 
group”. 
In the second experiment, the instructions for the leaders contained this: “Your task: You have 
been randomly selected to be the leader of your group, which will consist of two other 
members. Your role will be to guide the conversations with the other members of the group. 
Because of your leadership role in this task, your pay will be doubled at this stage of the 
experiment. The other members of the group do not know that your remuneration will be 
doubled: it is up to you to comment with them or not. You must memorize the result of the 









Instructions for Part 2 in Third Experiment: with audit 
[for GroupPC, instructions were identical except the fact that participants were informed that 
all the members must put on the same number, otherwise all the members would receive a 




















Instructions for Part 2 in Third Experiment: articles in the Professional Code of Ethics 























Final Part – last screen with identification code, sum of points and amount to receive 
 
 
